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ABSTRACT 
The European Council Helsinki Summit marked the initiation of the 
rapprochement procedure between Turkey and Greece, a dyad that for many 
decades was a source of instability in the Eastern part of Europe. After 1999, 
Greece abandoned the “Cold War rhetoric” in its relations with Turkey and shifted 
its foreign policy towards a more moderate stance by raising its veto regarding 
Turkey’s accession in the European Union (EU). Greece’s new foreign policy has 
many common elements with the Democratic Peace Theory of international 
relations. Hence, this thesis asks the following question: do the Greco-Turkish 
peaceful relations from 1999 until today fits the Democratic Peace Theory? By 
examining the three pillars of the theory, namely economic interdependence, 
consolidation of democracy and common participation in intergovernmental 
organization, the thesis concludes that the Democratic Peace Theory cannot 
explain the Greco-Turkish rapprochement procedure initiated by Greece after 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Greece and Turkey constitute an interesting and controversial dyad of the 
international system. The majority of scholars in the international relations field 
have characterized their relationship as conflicting, antagonistic, turbulent, 
problematic, etc. In spite of the turbulent relationship, both of Greece and Turkey 
have been “allies” in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952. 
Furthermore, Greece has been a member of the European Union (EU) since 
1981 and Turkey’s efforts to join the EU officially started during 1963.1 Greece, 
initially sought to obstruct Turkey’s entrance to the EU; however, in March 1995 
Greece suddenly removed its veto concerning the custom union of Turkey with 
the EU. That was the first sign of Greece’s change of stance towards Turkey’s 
European ambitions. In addition, during the Helsinki Summit in 1999, Greece 
openly changed its stance and decided to support Turkey’s European dream.  
Greece initiated its rapprochement policy towards Turkey because the 
costs of the alternative (continuous tension in their relationship) were too great. 
In order to avoid a future military conflict with Turkey, Greek politicians decided to 
see the foreign relations of Greece from a more liberal perspective. Therefore, 
this thesis argues that after 1999, the main axes of Greece policy towards Turkey 
have many common elements with the democratic peace theory. Greece decided 
to promote Turkey’s EU candidacy because according to Russett, “states 
typically share common institutions just because they have major interests in 
conflict as well as in common; institutions are supposed to provide a means to 
resolve those conflicts peacefully.”2 Furthermore, as Bearce and Omori note, 
“state leaders sometimes engage in economic integration in an effort to manage 
 
1 Only the European Economic Community (EEC) existed during that time. It was later 
referred to as European Community (EC), during the 1980s, and as European Union (EU) after 
1991. 
2 Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 26.   
 2
                                           
historically conflictual relationships.”3 Finally, Page, in one of her economic 
regionalism studies, argues that, “it is precisely former enemies which may want 
to institutionalize the end of conflict.”4 
Hence, this thesis will try to answer the following main question: do the 
Greco-Turkish peaceful relations that initiated after Greece’s decision in 1999 to 
support Turkey’s efforts for entrance in the EU fits the democratic peace theory? 
Since the democratic peace theory, as well as other liberal theories of 
international relations, is based upon three pillars, namely, democracy, economic 
interdependence and international organizations, in order to answer the main 
question we have to address some additional questions. More specifically, how 
does democracy and especially the efforts for the consolidation of a truly 
democratic regime that Turkey made after 1999, affect Greco-Turkish relations? 
At what level are the economic interactions of Greece and Turkey after the 
initiation of the rapprochement policy by Greece? How do the existent economic 
relations affect their bilateral relations? Did the EU, as an international 
organization, assist towards the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations? Is 
there any progress towards the resolution of the problems that poison the 
relations of the two states? Is there an element of the democratic peace theory 
that plays a more significant role in the promotion of peace and stability between 
the two countries? 
In Chapter II of the thesis, a summary of the contemporary problems that 
exist between the two countries will be provided. Being acquainted with the 
problematic issues that have been poisoning for so many decades the bilateral 
relations of Greece and Turkey is essential in distinguishing if the rapprochement 
procedure has generated any positive results concerning those issues.  
In Chapter III, a brief synopsis of the three main elements of the 
democratic peace theory will be also presented, through a detailed review of the 
 
3 David H. Bearce and Sawa Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?” 
Journal of Peace Research 42, no.6 (November 2005): 674.   
4 Sheila Page, Regionalism among Developing Countries (New York: St. Martin’s University 
Press, 2000), 62. 
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literature. This chapter will provide a comprehensive explanation of how 
democracy, economic interdependence and international organizations can be 
combined in order to promote peace and stability between states. In addition, a 
short reference will be made to the two prevailing explanations for the democratic 
peace theory, namely, the structural or institutional explanation and the cultural 
or normative explanation. Finally, in this chapter, evidences that support the 
argument that all the Greek governments regardless of party preferences,5 after 
the Helsinki Summit in 1999, became committed supporters of Turkey’s efforts to 
join the European family and thus tried to apply the fundamental assertions of the 
democratic peace theory, will be presented. 
Chapter IV will analyze the macroeconomic and trade data of the two 
countries in order to verify whether there is an improvement of the bilateral 
economic relationship and thus if the two countries fulfill successfully one of the 
three criteria of the democratic peace theory, namely, advanced/liberal economy 
with enhanced economic interdependence. The analysis of the two countries 
bilateral trade data will show that their economic relations remain limited and thus 
they perform relatively poor in terms of the economic interdependence pillar of 
the Democratic Peace Theory. Hence, this chapter will conclude that it is highly 
unlikely that economic relations will become so advanced in any domain as to 
assume a position of primacy in their bilateral relationship as a whole. 
Chapter V will investigate if the democratic pillar of the Democratic Peace 
Theory contributed to the establishment of peaceful relations between the two 
countries after 1999. More specifically, in this chapter an evaluation of whether 
Turkey became a more democratic state through its efforts to access in the EU, 
will be presented. The data will show that both countries improved their 
democratic indexes. The important finding is that Turkey, which is the less 
democratic country of the dyad and thus according to Russett and Oneal the 
primarily responsible for determining the likelihood of conflict, made important 
 
5 From 1999 to 2004, Greece had a government formed by PASOK (the leading Socialist 
Party in Greece). From 2004 until today, the power is in the hands of New Democracy (center-
right party). 
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steps towards the adoption of liberal democratic norms and rules. Therefore, the 
conclusion of this chapter is that democracy is the element of the democratic 
peace theory that plays the most significant role in the promotion of peace and 
stability between the two countries. 
The sixth chapter will examine whether the common participation of 
Greece and Turkey in the EU will be able to provide a viable solution in the 
problematic issues that exist between the two countries. In addition, this chapter 
will provide answers to the following questions. Why did their common 
participation in NATO fail to produce the virtuous circles that can lead to a 
resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes and, consequently, is the EU more 
capable of resolving these issues? The available evidence will show that until 
today neither NATO nor the EU is capable of contributing to a peaceful solution 
of the Greco-Turkish bilateral disputes. The problems that are poisoning the 
relations of the two countries still exist despite the fact that both countries have 
common participation in numerous intergovernmental organizations. Thus, the 
international organization pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory cannot 
sufficiently explain the peaceful relations that exist between the two countries 
after 1999. 
This thesis will conclude that the Democratic Peace Theory cannot explain 
the peaceful relations that established after Greece’s decision in 1999 to support 
Turkey’s EU vocation. In the period from 1999 until today, Greece and Turkey 
avoid a major crisis that could bring them close to a military conflict.6 Thus, an 
easy conclusion of this thesis could be that the major finding of the Democratic 
Peace Theory, namely that democracies do not fight each other, is valid in the 
case of the Greco-Turkish dyad. However, as Jane Addams believed, “peace is 




6 The last crisis that almost led the two countries to war was the “Imia crisis” in 1996. 
7 Jane Addams: American Social Reformer, Peace Activist. Nobel Peace Prize Winner, 1931. 
 5
case of Greece and Turkey, and that because it is difficult to claim that a 
peaceful relation exists when the causes of all the previous crises are still 
present.  
In this point, it is useful to mention that it is widely accepted that Greek–
Turkish relations are a complex process with multiple layers that has already 
been shaped by multiple critical domestic and international factors and actors. 
However, this thesis will deal only with the influence that EU had in the 
rapprochement procedure between Greece and Turkey, since EU has become 
the key reference point for Turkish policy after 1999, and has emerged as an 
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II. THE PRECARIOUS RELATIONSHIP OF GREECE AND 
TURKEY 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Even though, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, a rapprochement policy 
started by both the governments of Greece and Turkey, up to now many issues 
continue to cause tension in the two countries’ relations. This chapter will provide 
a brief overview of the main points of friction between Greece and Turkey. More 
specifically, we can separate the high-politics issues that cause tension between 
the two countries in two categories. The first category consists of issues that are 
related with the status quo of the Aegean Sea. The second category deals with 
the Cyprus issue. The main characteristic of both categories is that they consist 
of security related problems. Greece considers as a major threat to its security 
the Turkish claims over the Aegean Sea as well as the fact that Turkey did not 
hesitate to invade Cyprus back in 1974. 
A good knowledge of the problems that have shaped the Greek-Turkish 
relations during the last five decades will facilitate us in understanding the 
rationale behind Greece’s decision to support Turkey’s European aspirations. In 
addition, it is necessary to be acquainted with what has happened in the past in 
order to be able to compare it with the present-day situation and judge if the 
rapprochement policy had beneficial consequences in the two countries’ 
relations.  
B. POISONOUS ISSUES IN THE GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS 
1. Aegean Sea Issues 
a. Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
The dispute concerning the delimitation of the Aegean Sea’s 
continental shelf dates back to 1973, when the Turkish Official Gazette issued a 
decision with which permission for conducting petroleum research in the Aegean 
Sea was granted to TPAO (National Petroleum Company of Turkey). 
 8
                                           
Simultaneously, Turkey issued a map where the limits of its continental shelf 
were west of Greece’s easternmost islands. The main problem was that the area 
that Turkey was claiming as its continental shelf, “overlapped with the area of the 
continental shelf claimed by Greece, and in some cases the Turkish awards were 
in areas where Greece had already granted licenses to foreign companies.”8 
Unfortunately, this ongoing dispute led the two countries, during March of 1987, 
very close to a military conflict.9 Moreover, the delimitation of the Aegean Sea’s 
continental shelf remains an unresolved issue today because of the very different 
perspective that the two countries have regarding this problem. 
From Greece’s perspective, the delimitation of the continental shelf 
is the only legitimate dispute that exists between the two countries in the Aegean 
Sea, and thus need to be resolved. However, even if both countries have agreed 
that this issue needs to be resolved, a disagreement exists concerning the 
means that must be used for the resolution of the dispute. Greece supports the 
notion that the demarcation of the continental shelf is a purely legal issue and 
thus must be resolved through the arbitration of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). According to Greek officials, the Court is able to provide a clear and 
permanent solution to this contentious issue, as it has already done with similar 
cases in the past.10 An additional advantage to the arbitration by the International 
Court of Justice, according to Greece, is that the any decision of the Court will be 
 
8 Dimitris Dotas, “The Aegean Dispute and its Implications for the U.S. Policy,” Master’s 
thesis, (Naval Postgraduate School, 2000), 10. 
9 In March 1987, Turkey announced that Seismic 2, an oil exploration ship, would conduct oil 
research in the Aegean Sea and particularly in the area that was under dispute since 1973. 
Greece responded with a massive mobilization of its Armed Forces. A further escalation was 
avoided when Turkey canceled the mission of its survey ship. 
10 1967 North Sea Continental Shelf, Federal Republic of Germany against Netherlands; 
1967 North Sea Continental Shelf, Federal Republic of Germany against Denmark; 1978 
Continental Shelf, Tunisia against Libyan Arab Jamahiriya; 1982 Continental Shelf Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya against Malta. 
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final and binding to the parties, and if either fails in its obligation to the judgment, 
it will be answerable to the United Nations Security Council.11 
Turkey, on the other hand, claims that the delimitation of the 
Aegean Sea’s continental shelf is not only a legal issue, but also an old political 
problem between the two countries. Additionally, the Aegean Sea represents a 
special case of international law, and thus cannot have similar treatment with 
previous cases concerning delimitation of the continental shelf between 
neighboring states.12 Therefore, Turkey proposes that the problem must be 
resolved through bilateral negotiations between the two governments. Kemal 
Baslar resourcefully summarizes the reasons for the reluctance that Turkey is 
demonstrating towards a solution based on the arbitration of the International 
Court of Justice.13 To begin with, Turkey believes that “the Court’s timid attitude 
in contentious cases is a warning for Turkey that in the Aegean Dispute the ICJ is 
likely to uphold the present rules of international law and judge in favor of 
Greece.”14 Furthermore, there is a fear on the Turkish side that “there is no 
guarantee that the Court will remain always as a court of justice” because the 
judges can be biased by factors such as “nationality, the interests of the 
international society or even religion.”15 Finally, another weak point is that “the 
possible judgment of the Court cannot be prophesied beforehand.”16 Therefore, 
the predicament for Turkey is that “in cases where there is no established 
 
11 Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World 
(Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2005), 261. 
12 Turkey supports the view that the Aegean Sea is a semi-enclosed sea and that the Greek 
islands of the Aegean Sea cannot have their own continental shelf. Therefore, the proper solution 
is to divide the continental shelf with the demarcation of an imaginary line in the middle of the 
Aegean. Doing that, both countries will have equal rights in the exploitation of the resources that 
exist in the Aegean Sea. Additionally, Turkey claims that the above-mentioned equitable solution 
can be achieved through a bilateral agreement between Greece and Turkey.  
13 Kemal Baslar, “Two Facets of the Aegean Sea Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende,” 
in Turkey and International Law, ed. Kemal Baslar (Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001), 1–39. 
14 Ibid., 28. 




                                           
practice and consistent case law, conferring jurisdiction upon the Court could be 
of rather irreversible consequences.”17 It is obvious that the road towards the 
resolution of this issue will be long and full of convoluted issues.  
b. Length of Territorial Waters 
Currently, both countries have established in the Aegean Sea a six 
nautical miles zone of territorial waters.18 However, the United Nation 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-III) of 1982, in article 3, clearly 
states, “every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up 
to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines determined 
in accordance with this C
Greek Parliament ratified UNCLOS-III on May 31, 1995, and from 
that moment Greece made it clear that it is in its discretion when and where it is 
going to exercise these rights. On the other hand, Turkey did not become a 
signatory member of the UNCLOS-III, and therefore, according to Turkish 
officials, this law does not bind it. Moreover, just few days after the ratification of 
the UNCLOS-III by the Greek Parliament and more specifically on June 08, 1995, 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly issued a resolution, which stated that any 
unilateral extension of Greece’s territorial waters in the Aegean Sea beyond six 
nautical miles would be equivalent to a cause of war (casus belli) for Turkey. 
Greece from its side, argues that the declaration of a casus belli against Greece 
does not contribute towards the peaceful resolution of the differences that the 
two countries have, and additionally is a clear violation of international law, since 
 
17 Kemal Baslar, “Two Facets of the Aegean Sea Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende,” 
in Turkey and International Law, ed. Kemal Baslar (Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001), 30. 
18 Initially, both countries had agreed in 1923, by signing the Lausanne Peace Treaty, to 
keep their territorial waters within a three nautical mile zone. However, Greece first expanded its 
territorial waters to six nautical miles in 1936, while Turkey did the same in 1964 and in both 
cases, no tension was caused between them. 
19 For the complete text of the United Nation Convention on the law of the sea visit 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed August 
10, 2009). 
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Article 2, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Charter prohibits member-states 
from using or threatening to use violence. Greece’s position on the possible 
expansion of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles can be summarized in the 
words of Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis:  
Almost 160 countries have ratified the United Nation Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. One of the few that have not – i.e., the U.S. – 
recently declared its willingness to do so. This comes as no 
surprise, given that UNCLOS codified existing customary law. It put 
into paper existing practice. This is the trend internationally and the 
only rational and legal framework within which to converge our 
differing views.20 
Turkey’s main fear is that, if Greece decides to extend its territorial 
waters in the Aegean to 12 nautical miles, then automatically the Aegean Sea will 
become a Greek lake and thus access of Turkey’s commercial ships to the high 
seas from Turkish ports will be completely cut off. The following table shows that 
if Greece decides to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles then there 
will be an enormous increase of the Greek territorial sea, a minor increase of 
Turkish territorial sea and a huge decrease of high seas. 
Extent of territorial 
waters 
Greek territorial sea 
(percentage of the 
Aegean)  
Turkish territorial 
sea (percentage of 
the Aegean) 
High seas 
(percentage of the 
Aegean) 
6 nautical miles 
(present situation) 
43.68% 7.47% 48.85% 
12 nautical miles (if 
Greece decides to 
increase its territorial 
waters). 
71.53% 8.76% 19.71% 
Table 1.   Distribution of the Aegean Sea Territorial Waters21 
                                            
20 Interview of Greek Foreign Minister Bakoyannis to Hurriyet Daily News, Athens, 1 August, 
2009. The entire interview can be read at http://www.mfa.gr/Articles/en-US/010809_P1845.htm 
(accessed August 24, 2009).  
21 Table by the author, data derived from Kemal Baslar, “Two Facets of the Aegean Sea 
Dispute: de lege lata and de lege ferende,” in Turkey and International Law, ed. Kemal Baslar 
(Ankara: Ozen Publications, 2001), 1–39. 
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From its side, Greece is declaring that even if a unilateral extension 
of its territorial waters is decided, the free movement of commercial ships inside 
the Aegean will not be affected since the right of the “transit passage”22 will also 
be implemented, and therefore there is no reason to discuss this issue. 
Moreover, Greece is constantly reminding Turkey that it has already extended its 
territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the rest of the Mediterranean and in the 
Black Sea since 1964. 
The issues of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf and 
of the territorial waters are two interrelated issues. More specifically, if the two 
countries want to find a durable solution for the delimitation of the continental 
shelf, first they must resolve the dispute over the territorial waters. An 
unambiguous demarcation of the continental shelf in the Aegean demands a 
clear-cut determination of both countries’ territorial sea. Having solved this issue, 
the two countries will have a rigid base on which they can resolve the common 
accepted dispute of the delimitation of the continental shelf.  
c. “Grey Zones” in the Aegean Sea 
The Aegean Sea has over 3,100 islands, islets, and atolls.  A 
careful look at a navigational map of the region reveals that, with the exception of 
Tenedos, Imvros, Lagousai and 62 rocks located in close proximity with the 
Anatolian coast, the rest of the Aegean Sea’s islands are under Greek 
sovereignty. The most recent alteration of the status quo in the Aegean was 
made after the end of World War II with the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty of 
February 10, 1947, between the Allies and Italy. According to Article 14, 
paragraph 1 of the Treaty, the Dodecanese islands were ceded to Greece in full 
sovereignty.23 
 
22 According to articles 37 through 44 of the UNCLOS-III, the regime of “transit passage” is 
established, which means that all commercial ships and warships, as well as aircraft, have the 
right of passage through the territorial sea of the coastal state without its permission.   
23 Haralambos Athanasopoulos, Greece, Turkey and the Aegean Sea: a Case Study in 
International Law (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001), 76. 
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No one could imagine that after almost five decades, and more 
specifically in January 1996, the “Imia crisis”24 would lead Greece and Turkey 
very close to a full-scale armed conflict. After the end of this crisis, the “grey-
zones” theory came to the surface. According to this theory, Turkey supports that 
there is no legally determined status for a large number of Aegean islands and 
islets. Therefore, the two countries must initiate an overall negotiation in order to 
determine clearly and permanently the status of these islands. Turkey’s main 
argument is that the islands, which are not mentioned by their names in the 
Treaties that ceded them to Greece, cannot be considered under Greek 
sovereignty. Greece counter argues that the international legal framework, which 
formulated the existent status-quo in the area, is indisputable. More specifically, 
the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and Paris Peace Treaty (1947) leave no question 
concerning the status-quo of the islands that Turkey does not recognize as 
Greek territory. Greece believes that Turkey is trying to continue raising “add-on 
issues”25 with the purpose of pressuring Greece towards a general negotiation of 
the Aegean Sea’s status-quo in order to alter the current territorial status of the 
region, which is completely unfavorable to Turkey’s interests.  
 
24 On December 29, 1995, Turkey sent a verbal message to the Greek Embassy in Ankara 
claiming that the Imia islets are under Turkish sovereignty. After a few days, Greece responded, 
also with a verbal message, stating that Turkey’s allegations are unacceptable and that according 
to the already existent international legal framework, the Imia islets belong to Greece. Two weeks 
after the above-mentioned exchange, a journalist of the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet landed in a 
civilian helicopter on one of the two Imia islets, lowered the Hellenic flag and raised the Turkish 
flag. The next day a warship of the Hellenic Navy approached the islet and raised again the 
Hellenic flag. In response, Turkey sent a second verbal message, repeating its initial claims on 
the two islets and requesting negotiations in order to determine clearly the status of hundreds of 
Aegean islands, which always, according to Turkey’s assertions, had a legally undetermined 
status. Unfortunately, this verbal message was the drop that overflowed the glass of water. 
During the next few days, the Armed Forces of both countries came very close to a full-scale 
conflict. Furthermore, tension increased dramatically when Hellenic Navy Special Forces landed 
on the larger of the two Imia islets in order to guard the Hellenic flag, and few hours later Turkish 
commandos landed on the second islet. U.S. intervention demanding the withdrawal of both 
countries’ forces from the area and a return to the status quo ante caused a further escalation of 
the conflict to be avoided. 
25 Evangelos Raftopoulos, “The Crisis over the Imia Rocks and the Aegean Sea Regime: 
International Law as a Language of Common Interest,” The International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 12, no.4 (November 1997): 427–46. 
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d. Greek Air Space 
Similar with the above-mentioned problematic issues that exist in 
the Greco-Turkish relations, the problem of the Greek National Airspace 
emerged after the 1974 Turkish invasion in Cyprus. From 1931, Greece had 
established a 10-nautical-mile airspace26 and at the same time, it officially 
informed all the responsible international organizations. At that time, no country, 
including Turkey, raised any objection concerning the paradox phenomenon of a 
country having a 3 nautical miles of territorial waters (extended to six nautical 
miles in 1936) and 10 nautical miles of national air space. Furthermore, in the 
first conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1952, in 
which both Greece and Turkey participated, there was a unanimous vote 
concerning the Athens Flight Information Region (FIR). More specifically the 
decision dictated, “except for a narrow strip of national airspace along the Turkish 
coast, responsibility for Aegean air space should fall to the Athens FIR.”27  
After the Cyprus crisis of 1974 and until today, Turkey does not 
recognize Greece’s jurisdiction over the entire 10-nautical-mile air space zone, 
but only up to six nautical miles. Therefore, it does not submit flight plans to 
Greece for its military aircrafts that are flying in the Aegean Sea. Greece 
considers this action as violation of the International Air Traffic Rules. This 
dispute results, in the majority of the incidents and usually in a daily basis, in 
dangerous dogfights between Greek and Turkish fighter jets.28  
Quoting the words of a Greek academic is the best way to 
summarize the current situation concerning all of the above-mentioned Aegean 
Sea’s issues. “Currently, there is not even agreement over what the ‘Aegean 
 
26 Presidential Decree of 18 September 1831 published in the Governmental Gazette, Paper 
Sheet A’ 325/1931). 
27 Dotas, “The Aegean Dispute,” 15. 
28 Unfortunately, sometimes these dogfights end up very badly. For example, read, “A 
Dangerous Dogfight,” at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,119712,00.html (accessed 
August 20, 2009) concerning the most recent lethal collision between a Hellenic and a Turkish F-
16 fighter jet during a dogfight over the Greek island of Karpathos, located in the Eastern part of 
the Aegean Sea.   
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dispute’ consist of, with Turkey insisting that there is a list of unresolved issues to 
address, and Greece saying there is only one, the delineation of the continental 
shelf.”29 
2. The Cyprus Issue 
Probably one of the most serious problems between the two countries is 
the 1974 Turkish invasion and occupation of approximately one third of the 
Republic of Cyprus’ territory until the present day. Why is Greece so upset about 
this event since Greece and Cyprus are two separate, independent states? The 
answer is that Greece and Cyprus are indeed two different states, but they are 
part of the same nation (Hellenic nation), their citizens have the same language, 
the same religion (the vast majority are Christian Orthodox), the same national 
anthem, and even the same traditions. In addition, during the past Greek 
Cypriots made efforts to achieve unification with Greece but with unfortunate 
results. Finally, many people in Greece feel that their country is one of the main 
responsible for the tragedy of the Greek-Cypriots. Therefore, there is a 
widespread desire throughout the Greek population and subsequently in the 
Greek political leadership, to assist with all the available means the efforts that 
the Republic of Cyprus is making towards the resolution of this issue. The 
importance of this issue for the Greeks and the Greek-Cypriots is made very 
clear by the words of the current Prime Minister of Greece, Konstantinos 
Karamanlis:  
The settlement of the Cyprus problem is a high priority for Greece 
and an essential component to long-lasting improvement in Greek-
Turkish relations. After all, the perception of a military threat from 
Turkey has dominated Greek public debate and security planning 
since the 1974 Cyprus crisis. In a post-Cold War world that has 
recently shown such a keen interest in opposing the displacement 
of peoples (a policy supported by Greece during NATO’s 
 
29 Constantine Papadopoulos, “Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to 
Politics,” in the Long Shadow of Europe: Greeks and Turks in the Era of Post nationalism, ed. 
Othon Anastasakis, Kalypso Aude Nicolaidis and Kerem Oktem (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2009), 312. 
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intervention in Yugoslavia), the military occupation currently in 
place in the Northern part of Cyprus needs a viable resolution. Ten 
years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the last dividing wall in Europe 
still stands in Cyprus.30 
After Cyprus’ independence from Britain in 1960, the Greek-Cypriot and 
Turkish-Cypriot communities began to behave aggressively towards each other. 
The hostility between the two communities transformed into an open conflict and 
finally, in 1974, the Greek Junta planned and executed a coup against the legal 
government of Cyprus with the justification that this was the only way for Greece 
and Cyprus to achieve the long desired “Union.” A few days later, Turkey invaded 
the island in order to guarantee the safety of the Turkish-Cypriot community. 
From that time until now, there have been numerous unsuccessful efforts to find 
a viable solution to the Cyprus issue. Cyprus is still divided, and the part of the 
island that is occupied by Turkish Armed Forces has not been recognized 
officially as an independent state by any country; thus, it has remained isolated. 
Moreover, Turkey has not recognized Cyprus despite the fact that since 2004, 
Cyprus has been a permanent member of the EU and Turkey is a candidate 
country for EU.31 
 
 
30 Konstantinos Karamanlis, “Greece: The E.U’s Anchor of Stability in a Troubled Region,” 
The Washington Quarterly 23, no.2 (Spring 2000): 7–11. 
31 The parallel history of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey in the context of the EU will be 
analyzed in the subsequent section of this thesis. 
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III. DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY  
A. THE KANTIAN APPROACH  
Immanuel Kant with his essay “Perpetual Peace”32 was the first person to 
link the ideal of democracy with the preservation of world peace. According to 
Kant, there are three main elements of a peaceful coexistence between 
republics. Each element will be briefly analyzed in the following sections. 
1. Democracy and Public Opinion 
Public opinion plays an important role in the planning and application of 
one state’s foreign policy. In particular, it can act as a counterforce against any 
kind of violent behavior or antagonism. As Kant stated, “if the consent of the 
citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is 
more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor 
game, decreeing for themselves all the calamities of war.”33 
Many academics have supported Kant’s views by arguing that the public 
opinion can indeed affect the foreign policy of a democratic state.34 Of course, 
the degree of influence that the public opinion has varies, and it is analogous to 
each democracy’s political and constitutional procedures.35 If we especially 
examine the case of dyadic relations, then it is possible that the greater the 
public’s opinion influence, the bigger the danger of hindering cooperation 
between states.36 That happens because usually in democratic states the 
 
32 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politic, History, and Morals 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). 
33 Ibid., 12. 
34 Bruce Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).  
35 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal 
Democracies,” World Politics 43, (1991): 479–512.  
36 Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” 
International Organization 42, (1988): 427–60. 
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government must first precede with the ratification of its policies on a domestic 
level, then move forward and start negotiating on the international level. 
2. International Trade 
The second vital element of the democratic peace theory always, 
according to Kant, can be summarized in his following statement: “A peaceful 
traffic among nations was established, and thus understanding, conventions, and 
peaceable relations were established among the most distant people.”37 In the 
majority of the cases, international commerce entails great profits for democratic 
states, which can be translated into increased levels of prosperity for the citizens 
of these states. Consequently, the majority of the democratic states “are self-
deterred from fighting wars against one another because of the prospective 
losses that could result from disrupted trade.”38 Many researchers verify Kant’s 
argument that trade is a major contributor to peaceful relations and thus states 
with strong commercial ties are less likely to start a war.39 Naturally, there are 
also some objections to the previous argument. More specifically, many scholars 
do not deny the peaceful aspects of trade; however, they support the view that 
economic interdependence can lead to conflictual situations as well.40 
Nevertheless, since the majority of the states in the international system choose 
their trade partners based on the element of mutual trust, and always having in 
mind the security implications involved in such activities, major academics 
support a general conclusion. This conclusion states that even if commercial ties 
 
37 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 28. 
38 Steve Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise,” Mershon 
International Studies Review 41, no.1 (May 1997), 75. 
39 Solomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no.2 
(1980): 55–78; William K. Domke, War and Changing Global System (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988); William J. Nixon and Bruce E. Moon, “Political Similarity and American 
Foreign Trade Patterns,” Political Research Quarterly 46, no.3 (1993): 5–25; Joanne Gowa, 
Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994);Edward 
D. Mansfield, Power, Trade and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
40 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Complex Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977); Michael S. De Vries, “Interdependence, Cooperation and 
Conflict: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Peace Research 27, (1990): 429–44. 
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are not absolutely certain that they can lead to peace, democratic countries have 
the tendency to establish close trade relations with each other and furthermore 
they have more peaceful relations among them.41   
3. Establishment of a Peaceful Confederation 
The establishment of a peaceful confederation between the already 
existent democratic states will avert them from going to war. This kind of 
association will help towards the consolidation of internationally shared norms 
and values, which in turn will contribute, to the strengthening of peaceful 
procedures for the resolution of interstate problematic issues. According again to 
Kant, a peaceful confederation would “eventually include all nations and thus 
lead to perpetual peace.”42 Steve Chan states the causal mechanism behind this 
argument briefly, “as democracies increase in number, a general strategy for 
conditional cooperation should become more attractive for all states. The norms 
guiding democracies’ interactions could evolve into the dominant pattern in 
international relations.”43 Following the same logic, Daniel Deudney suggested 
that, “a world dominated by liberal states affords the remaining illiberal states 
both a need and an opportunity to liberalize.”44  
It is clear that Greece’s policy of rapprochement towards Turkey after 
1999 was based on these three elements. The political leaders of Greece 
realized, especially after the Imia crisis of 1996 where the two countries reached 
the brink of war, that the only way to gain public support is to initiate a policy of 
appeasement towards Turkey. It is evident that citizens are not willing to pay the 
grave consequences of a military conflict; on the other hand, the deeper 
 
41 John R. Oneal, Frances H. Oneal, Zeev Maoz, and Bruce M. Russet, “The Liberal Peace: 
Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950–1985,” Journal of Peace 
Research 33, (1996): 11–28; Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, “Power Politics and 
International Trade,” American Political Science Review 87, (1993): 408–20. 
42 Kant, Perpetual Peace, 117. 
43 Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77. 
44 Daniel Deudney, “The International Sources of Soviet Change,” International Security 16, 
no.3 (1991), 97. 
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integration of Greece in the European Union can offer only advantages for the 
Greek population. Therefore, it was evident that the majority of the Greek 
population supported the decision of the government to back Turkey’s European 
aspirations. Consequently, during the 2004 election, when a new government 
was elected, the conservative party of “New Democracy” took the power from the 
Pan-Hellenic Socialist Party (PASOK), but the policy of rapprochement towards 
Turkey remained the same. 
Furthermore, Greece, by its decision to support Turkey’s efforts for 
accession in the EU, opened the road towards the Custom Union of Turkey with 
the EU. In this way, Greece tried to enhance its bilateral economic relations with 
its neighboring state in order to increase the costs of a future conflict. Finally, the 
negotiations between the EU and Turkey concerning the entrance of the latter in 
the European family will certainly lead Turkey to a further democratization of its 
political system. This means that Turkey must adopt a less aggressive behavior 
towards its neighboring states and, in general, will have to adopt norms, values 
and patterns of behavior that will help towards the peaceful resolution of 
conflictual issues.    
B. EXPLANATIONS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
The following section contains a short analysis of the efforts that various 
prominent academics made in order to interpret the democratic peace theory. 
1. The Institutional or Structural Explanation 
The institutional or structural explanation was the research subject of 
many contemporary academics.45 Their main argument is that “the institutional 
 
45 Melvin Small and David J. Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes,” 
Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 1, no.4 (1976): 50–69; Rudolph J. Rummel, 
“Libertarian and International Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, (1983): 27–71; Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman, War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992); Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and 
Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,” American Political Science Review 87, 
(1993): 624–38; John M. Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International 
Security 19, no.2 (1994): 87–125; James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the 
Escalation of International Disputes,” American Political Science Review 88, (1994): 577–92.  
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arrangements of a democracy limit the autonomy and discretion of leaders to 
launch war.”46 According to Maoz and Russett, this argument is based on the 
following two assumptions: 
1) International challenges require political leaders to mobilize 
domestic support to their policies. Such support must be mobilized 
from those groups that provide the leadership the kind of legitimacy 
that is required for international action. 
2) Shortcuts to political mobilization of relevant political support can 
be accomplished only in situations that can be appropriately 
described as emergencies.47  
Consequently, as Bueno de Mesquita suggests, “democracies are more 
deliberate in their decision making than autocracies because their procedures 
preclude unilateral action by leaders.”48 The previous statement implies that in 
democratic states where the decision-making procedures are complex and they 
demand the support of the vast majority of the population, the political leaders 
are aware that their decision to wage war will entail a devastating political cost. 
The only exception to this rule are cases “wherein war seems a necessity or 
when the war aims are seen as justifying the mobilization costs.”49 However, 
Maoz and Russet’s argument implies that a democratic state will not be hostile 
against any kind of regime, either democratic or authoritarian. This is against the 
historical record that on the contrary proves that democracies do not wage war 
against each other, but in many cases engage in wars with authoritarian states.50  
 
 
46 Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77. 
47 Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 626. 
48 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, 
“An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic Peace,” The American Political Science Review 
93, no.4 (December 1999), 792. 
49 Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 626. 
50 John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, 
Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950–1985,” International Studies Quarterly 41, (June 1997): 
267–93. 
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Summarizing the structural/institutional explanation, we conclude that 
democratic political leaders will always be supportive of a peaceful resolution of 
problems related with the foreign policy and national interests of their country, 
just because the alternative option will bear heavier costs on them.51 “All of this 
comes from the free movement of information in liberal democracies, the 
existence of opposition groups, and the accountability of national leaders, which 
make democracy transparent to outsiders.”52  
2. The Normative or Cultural Explanation 
The main argument of the normative/cultural school of thought is that all 
democracies “externalize their domestic political norms of tolerance and 
compromise in their foreign relations, thus making war with others like them 
unlikely.”53 Maoz and Russett add two basic assumptions to this argument, 
1) States, to the extent possible, externalize the norms of behavior 
that are developed within and characterize their domestic political 
processes and institutions. 
2) The anarchic nature of international politics implies that a clash 
between democratic and nondemocratic norms is dominated by the 
latter, rather than by the former.54 
More specifically, the first assumption suggests that fundamental 
democratic principles, one of which is the resolution of political differences in the 
domestic level without the use of violence, can be used to solve conflictual issues 
in the international level as well. In a democracy, domestic political dispute does 
not have the form of a zero-sum game where the winner takes it all and the loser 
is doomed to disappear from the state’s political picture. On the contrary, in a 
 
51 The vast majority of the academics that have analyzed the issue of democratic peace 
assume that all political leaders, either of a liberal or authoritarian regime, are motivated by their 
strong desire to remain in power. 
52 Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, 
and International Organizations (New York: Norton & Company, 2001), 54. 
53 Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77. 
54 Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 625. 
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situation like the previous one, usually prevails “an atmosphere of live and let live 
that results in a fundamental sense of stability at the personal, communal, and 
national level.”55 As Morgan and Campell successfully emphasize, “the key 
feature of democracy is government by the people, and the people, who must 
bear the costs of war, are usually unwilling to fight.”56  
The second assumption deals with the anarchical structure of the 
international system and the impediments that it imposes to the propagation of 
democratic norms. One of the main characteristics of the anarchical international 
system is that it is a self-help system. Every state has a primary target, which is 
its survival. Only its own forces can guarantee the maintenance of a state’s 
sovereignty. Therefore, if a democratic state has to choose between a 
democratic behavior that will possibly endanger its national interests or its 
sovereignty and an undemocratic behavior that will enhance its sense of security, 
then it is very likely to choose the application of nondemocratic norms in order to 
satisfy its security dilemma. It is empirically observed that this shift occurs when 
a democracy is in conflict with an authoritarian rival. In the case of two 
democracies facing each other in conflictual issues, it is almost certain that their 
interaction will be characterized by the application of the democratic norms 
discussed earlier. This reciprocal behavior will prevent the escalation of a small 
crisis to a full-scale conflict and will lead to a peaceful settlement, either by 
compromise or by third-party arbitration.57  
Naturally, the cultural/normative explanation has some deficiencies. In one 
of his articles, Harvey Starr questioned whether democracies generally treat 
each other better. His answer was that “they do not, even though they always 
 
55 Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 625.  
56 Clifton T. Morgan, and Sally Howard Campbell, “Domestic Structure, Decisional 
Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, (June 
1991), 201. 
57 William J. Dixon, “Democracy and the Management of International Conflict,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 37, (1993): 42–68. 
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manage to avoid escalating their disputes to outright war.”58 However, Joanne 
Gowa articulated the most insightful criticism, supporting the view that it is very 
difficult to understand if the behavior of a state is based on the application of 
democratic norms or on the sponsoring and promotion of their national 
interests.59 If the latter is true, then democracies are behaving according to the 
principles of the realist theory of international relations, and thus they are no 
different from nondemocratic states. Nevertheless, there is not much evidence in 
support of this criticism. Academics that attempted to establish a relation 
between state’s common interests (for example through the formation of 
alliances) and the possibility of interstate violence, failed to do so.60   
Finally, many academics tried to compare the two explanations, with the 
vast majority of them concluding that the cultural/normative explanation of 
democratic peace is more credible than the structural/institutional. In more detail, 
Maoz and Russett draw the conclusion that “the relationship between institutional 
constrains and measure of dispute and war occurrence is not as robust as the 
relationship between measures of democratic norms and the dependent 
variables.”61 Furthermore, Morgan and Campell confirm the previous argument 
by stating that, “…structural constrains on chief decision makers are not 
important determinants of the probability that disputes escalate to war.”62   
3. The Rationalist Explanation 
The main question that arises from the previous two sections is whether 
there is a method of combining the two explanations in order to generate a single 
 
58  Harvey Starr, “Why Don’t Democracies Fight One Another? Evaluating the Theory-
Finding Research Loop,” Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 14, no.4 (1992), 48. 
59 Joanne Gowa, “Democratic States and International Disputes,” International Organization 
49, (1995): 511–22. 
60 David L. Rousseau, Christopher Gelpi, Dan Reiter, and Paul K. Huth, “Assessing the 
Dyadic Nature of the Democratic Peace, 1918–1988,” American Political Science Review 90, 
(1996): 512–33. 
61 Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes,” 636. 
62 Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 77. 
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and sound justification of the democratic peace theory. It is true that many 
prominent academics have examined the possibility of combining the principle 
assumptions of the debated explanations.63 Steve Chan, in one of his articles, 
named this methodology the “rationalist approach.” He supports the view that the 
rationalist approach emphasizes “on [sic] elite perception deliberate calculation, 
cross-national signaling, and expected- utility formulation.”64 Thus, the 
motivations behind a democratic leader’s decision play a very important role in 
the formulation of the democratic peace puzzle. For example, if a democratic 
leader decides to initiate a conflict with a non-democratic state, then it is possible 
that his fellow citizens will support his decision (the so-called “rally around the 
flag syndrome”). However, if the same leader decides to attack a democratic 
state, then it is very likely that he will not have support from the citizens. In fact, 
the people will probably conceive his actions as a sign of political catastrophe.65 
Therefore, one of the advantages of the rationalist approach is that it gives us “a 
powerful basis for understanding why democracies are peaceful toward each 
other but not toward non-democracies.”66 
The current thesis will refer only to the latest work that is using the 
rationalist approach. Russett and Oneal, in their book Triangulating Peace, 
clearly suggest that “the two explanations are really complementary: culture 
influences the creation and evolution of political institutions, and institutions 
shape culture,”67 and they conclude that, “the two approaches can be reconciled 
to show how they affect the opportunity and willingness of decision makers to 
 
63 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, 
(1995): 379–414; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999. 
64 Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 79. 
65 Alex Mintz, and Nehemia Geva, “Why Don’t Democracies Fight Each Other? An 
Experimental Assessment of the ‘Political Incentive’ Explanation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 
37, (1995): 484–503. 
66 Chan, “In Search of Democratic Peace,” 80. 
67 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 53. 
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choose between conflict and cooperation.”68  Consequently, Russett and Oneal, 
following the “rationalist approach,” argued that, “countries that fulfill successfully 
and durably three interrelated criteria, namely consolidated democracy, 
advanced/liberal economy with economic interdependence, and joint 
membership in regional organizations, simply do not fight wars with each 
other.”69  
The same approach will also be used to test if the democratic peace 
theory can be applied to the Greco-Turkish dyad. More specifically, this thesis 
will follow Russett and Oneal’s steps in order to examine if the rapprochement 
policy, which initiated in 1999 after the Helsinki Summit, managed to strengthen 
the economic ties between the two countries. Moreover, if Turkey, through its 
efforts to fulfill the criteria for accession to the EU, became more democratic, and 
finally if the possibilities of a conflict between Greece and Turkey have been 
reduced because of their common participation in international organizations (for 
the purposes of this thesis, the EU and NATO). 
C. THE RATIONALE BEHIND GREECE’S RAPPROCHEMENT POLICY 
In this section, a short analysis of the reasons that exist behind Greece’s 
decision to support Turkey’s EU bid will be provided. By explaining the rationale 
behind Greece’s rapprochement policy, it will become evident that the political 
leaders in Greece based their new policy, in a large extent, on the principles of 
the Democratic Peace Theory.   
The major turning point in Greece’s policy in general, and especially with 
regard to the European future of Turkey, was the “Imia crisis” during 1996.70 This 
 
68 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 54. 
69 Ibid., 87. 
70 For a chronology of the events that led to the Imia crisis read, Stelios Arapoglou, Dispute 
in the Aegean Sea, the Imia/Kardak Crisis (Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, 2002). 
Also, for the two countries view of the Imia crisis according to the international law read, 
Haralambos Athanasopoulos, Greece, Turkey, and the Aegean Sea: a Case Study in 
International Law (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2001); Deniz Bolukbasi, The Aegean 
Disputes, a Unique Case in International Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2004). 
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crisis nearly caused a war between the two countries, but also contributed 
significantly to Greece’s change of stance on several issues. The “Imia crisis” 
proved clearly and beyond any doubt that Turkey’s foreign policy, followed by 
continuous provocations, mainly in Aegean air space and territorial waters, could 
easily get out of hand with unpleasant results for both countries. During that 
period, and after the first shock of the Imia crisis, the new elected socialist 
government of Konstantinos Simitis decided to initiate a tension-reducing policy 
towards Turkey. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this change of stance 
towards Turkey was facilitated by the creation of sentiments of solidarity and 
sympathy between the citizens of the two countries due to the catastrophic 
earthquakes that hit both countries during the summer of 1999. Everyone in 
Greece agreed that the maintenance of a hostile atmosphere, or even worse, the 
outbreak of a war with Turkey, would result in a serious decline in Greece’s 
economy (reduction of gains from tourism, domestic and foreign investments, 
trade, etc.). Furthermore, it would be a big obstacle to Greece’s efforts for deeper 
integration in the EU, namely, Greece policymakers’ efforts for accession to the 
European Monetary Union. 
At this point, it must be mentioned that Greece is a clearly democratic 
status quo country, thus it does not have any territorial or other type of claims 
towards its neighboring states with the purpose of changing the balance of power 
in its region. It is very satisfied with the regional and international status quo and 
is not motivated to generate disputes that would probably escalate to a conflict. 
Thus, Greece understood that the only way to solve the long-term problems that 
it continued to have with Turkey was to help Turkey towards further 
democratization by supporting its efforts for accession in the EU. As Bennett 
argues, countries that face enduring disputes have more possibilities of resolving 
those disputes during a period in which both countries happen to be 
democratic.71 Moreover, democracies tend to resolve their differences either 
 
71 Scott Bennett, “Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration, 1816-1985,” American 
Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (1998): 1200–32. 
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through mutual concession or by using third parties for arbitration.72 Therefore, 
the range of legitimate reasons to use force is greatly restricted between 
democracies. In our case, and as mentioned in Chapter II, Greece preferred to 
take advantage of Turkey’s desire to join the EU, and tried to transfer the 
disputes that had with Turkey to the EU level.   
For this reason, the Greek government applied the so-called “Simitis 
doctrine,” which was a perceptible synthesis of “international law, international 
ethics, solidarity with like-minded international actors, and reliance on 
appropriate international organizations, together with a simultaneous 
commitment to a strong Greece (economically, politically and diplomatically) and 
to rational, that is, moderate deterrence.”73 In other words, Greece maintained its 
position that the only Aegean issue demanding resolution is the delimitation of 
the continental shelf, and it insisted on its proposition to negotiate this issue by 
submitting it to the International Court of Justice. In addition, Greece is still 
supporting that the rest of the Turkish claims are not acceptable because they all 
involve non-negotiable issues of sovereignty.  
On the other hand, right after the Helsinki Summit Greek, political leaders 
clearly expressed their support towards Turkey’s efforts for accession in the EU. 
The new element of Greece’s policy and the main reason for the shift in its 
stance toward Turkey was the fact that Greek politicians decided to see the 
foreign relations of Greece from a more liberal perspective. A careful reading of 
the “Simitis doctrine” definition identifies the main axes of Greece’s policy, which 
has many common elements with the Democratic Peace Theory as it is 
expressed by Russett and Oneal in their book Triangulating Peace. 
 
 
72 Michael Mousseau, “Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts 1816-
1992,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no.2 (1998): 210–30. 
73 Costas Melakopides, “Implications of the Accession of Cyprus to the European Union for 
Greek-Turkish and Euro-Turkish Relations,” Mediterranean Quarterly, (Winter 2006):73–101. 
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More specifically, after the end of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, in which 
Turkey became a candidate state for the EU with the support of Greece, 
prominent Greek politicians made several statements that show clearly the 
embracement and application of the Democratic Peace principles. For example, 
George Papandreou, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time,74 in one 
of his articles clearly stated that,  
With the harrowing war in Kosovo still fresh in our memories, the 
Greek people are critically aware of the importance of good 
neighborly relations. We believe that our neighbor’s strength is our 
strength. To exclude a country from the full benefits of international 
society is a sure path to the kind of crises we have faced for too 
long in Southeast Europe.75 
With the previous statement, Mr. Papandreou showed that Greece’s policy 
of rapprochement towards Turkey was based on the belief that only through the 
common participation in international institutions (in our case the EU) could 
peaceful relations between neighboring states effectively be promoted. 
Moreover, in the same article Mr. Papandreou emphasized the fact that, 
“Greece is committed to embracing all nations which strive for democracy within 
their frontiers, and peaceful cooperation beyond them, in the European family.”76 
Here it is clear that Greece’s desire was the further consolidation of democratic 
norms in Turkey through the requirements that the EU has for candidate 
members. Again, we can observe a clear link with the Democratic Peace Theory, 
since according to Russett and Oneal, in a dyad between a democratic (Greece) 
and a less democratic state (Turkey), if we manage to make the less democratic 
state more democratic then the probability that the two states will involve in a 
 
74 As this thesis was still in process and particularly on October 4, 2009, national elections 
took place in Greece and Mr. Papandreou became the Prime Minister when his party (Pan-
Hellenic Socialist Party) won the elections over the Conservative Party of New Democracy. 
75 George Papandreou, “Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade,” The New York Times, 
December 10, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/10/opinion/10iht-edgeorge.2.t.html 
(accessed October 1, 2009). 
76 Ibid. 
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military conflict is drops significantly.77 According to the authors of Triangulating 
Peace, “the higher the level of democracy a state achieves, the more peaceful 
that state is likely to be. Transitions in themselves do not appear dangerous. It is 
important, however, that a transition become consolidated at a high level of 
stable, institutionalized democracy.”78 Therefore, Greece as a status-quo country 
that seeks peaceful coexistence with its neighboring states realized that the only 
way Turkey could become more democratic was by trying to adopt the acquis 
communautaire and fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, as well as the additional 
criteria concerning its relations with Greece and Cyprus. 
Greece’s policy of rapprochement towards Turkey did not change when 
the new conservative government of Greece assumed its duties after the 
elections of 2004. The new Prime Minister, Konstantinos Karamanlis, leader of 
the New Democracy Conservative Party, moved in the same direction as the 
previous Socialist government concerning the efforts of Turkey to join the EU. On 
May 7, 2004, the Turkish Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, became the first 
Turkish leader to visit Greece in sixteen years. The statements of the two leaders 
after their meeting in Athens are indications of the positive climate that existed 
between the two countries. In detail, Mr. Karamanlis stated that, “I confirmed the 
support of the Greek government and me personally for Turkey’s course towards 
Europe and Mr. Erdogan’s reform program.”79 On the same spirit, Mr. Erdogan 
stated that, “It is time to look ahead to new horizons. We have to turn to the 
future and let the events of the past remain in the past. Peace and love is [sic] 
deep in the hearts of our two peoples.”80 Mr. Erdogan’s visit to Athens is 
additional evidence that the two countries were determined to reduce the 
dangerous tension that existed in their bilateral relations before 1999. As Ker-
 
77 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 109. 
78 Ibid., 122. 
79 Helena Smith, “Greece to Back Turkey’s EU Bid,” The Guardian, May 8, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/08/turkey.eu (accessed October 1, 2009). 
80 Ibid. 
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Lindsay, the director of a think-tank located in Cyprus, stated, “Greece has 
realized, above all, that a European Turkey will be a less threatening Turkey.”81     
Consequently, Greece followed the same approach regarding its relations 
with Turkey because among the majority of Greek politicians there was a wide 
consensus that the EU could produce the desirable virtuous circles that for years 
Greece sought.82 Helpful to that direction was the fact that, “The European 
experience of the late twentieth century shows that it is possible to establish 
virtuous circles that solidify peaceful relations even while states retain many of 
their traditional Westphalian characteristics.”83 At the time that Greece decided to 
support the efforts of Turkey for accession to the EU, Turkey was still (and 
maybe still is) a state with many Westphalian characteristics. Nevertheless, 
Greece was convinced that the most effective virtuous circles between the two 
countries could only be created through the accession of Turkey in the EU. In 
particular, Greek policy was inspired by visionary leaders like Jean Monnet, 
Konrad Adenauer, and Robert Schuman, who right after the ending of World War 
II “consciously decided to break the old pattern of hostility and war by creating a 
set of virtuous circles that would both directly and indirectly promote peaceful 
relations.”84  
Furthermore, in Greece there was a widespread belief that its supportive 
stance could cause a “spillover” effect in the relations between the two 
countries.85 Therefore, Greece was hoping that its policy would improve all the 
levels of Greek-Turkish relations, including the more important level of economic 
 
81 Helena Smith, “Greece to Back Turkey’s EU Bid,” The Guardian, May 8, 2004, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/may/08/turkey.eu (accessed October 1, 2009). 
82 According to Russett and R.Oneal, virtuous circles in world politics are peaceful 
interactions that are not seen as threatening but rather as mutually beneficial. These benefits can 
increase over time and expand in scope.  
83 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 28. 
84 Ibid., 24. 
85 Institutions like the EU, whose existence serves and fulfills certain functions or needs, in 
many cases create the conditions for further cooperation in related areas of social life.  
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relations. The existence of additional possibilities for economic gains in both 
countries through continuous and enhanced interaction could influence in a very 
positive way their sensitive relations. It is the classical “wealth makes peace” 
argument, and as Russett argues, “for politically stable, economically advanced, 
and rapidly growing countries the cost/benefit ratio of any war fought on or near 
their home territories with another advanced state looks extraordinarily 
unpromising.”86 Therefore, it is evident that Greece’s main scope was to support 
Turkey in entering not only the EU, but also the “Kantian triangle of peace.”87 
Democracy, international organizations and economic interdependence are 
located on the three corners and peace is located on the center of the Kantian 
triangle. Greece’s main purpose is to establish its position, along with Turkey, in 
the center of this triangle. According to Greek politicians, one way to achieve this 
goal is to support the European dream of Turkey. 
 
 
86 Russett, Controlling the Sword, 28. 
87 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 35. 
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ace and to try to avert war.”91  
                                           
IV. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE AND GRECO-TURKISH 
RELATIONS  
This chapter will examine the economic relations between Turkey and 
Greece after the beginning of the rapprochement policy in 1999, and will try to 
evaluate them in order to conclude if the economic interdependence leg of the 
Democratic Peace Theory can explain the peaceful coexistence of the two 
countries. Specifically, this chapter will try to test one of the three hypotheses of 
the Democratic Peace Theory, namely, that “the probability two states will 
become embroiled in conflict is inversely related to the degree to which they are 
economically interdependent.”88  
A. THE ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE HYPOTHESIS AS AN 
ELEMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
Numerous research focused on the relation between economic 
interdependence and peace found a noteworthy inverse relationship between the 
interdependence of commerce or the common membership in commercial 
institutions and the possibility for the initiation of a military conflict.89 
Furthermore, Russett and Oneal concluded that, “countries that are 
interdependent bilaterally or economically open to the global economy, whether 
democratic or not, have an important basis for pacific relations and conflict 
resolution.”90 Hence, it is widely accepted that “the spirit of commerce creates 
incentives for states to promote pe
 
88 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 139. 
89 Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, and David H. Bearce, “Preferential Trading 
Arrangements and Military Disputes,” Security Studies 9, no.1 (2000): 477–513; Edward D. 
Mansfield, and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Trade Blocs, Trade Flows, and International Conflict,” 
International Organization 54, no.4 (2000): 775–808. 
90 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 155. 
91 Michael W. Doyle, “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace,” The American Political Science 
Review, 99, no.3 (August 2005): 463–466. 
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However, the view can be supported that the absence of military conflict 
exists not because of the strong commercial relations between states, but rather 
because it is easer to establish closer economic relations with states that desire 
peace. Thus, there is a question if this theoretically logical reverse causal 
argument is valid. According to the findings of Mansfield and Pevehouse, 
“military disputes generally do not have a strong short-term influence on whether 
states belong to the same economic arrangement.”92 Likewise, Mansfield, Milner 
and Rosendorff proved that there is no causal mechanism between military 
conflicts and common participation in commercial institutions or trade 
agreements.93 All of the above-mentioned studies point to the fact that “the 
stronger causal relationship runs from commercial institutions to peace, even if it 
also runs weakly in the other direction.”94  
The main question that arises is how economic interdependence promotes 
peace. In order to answer this question, a short reference must first be made to 
the potential causes of military conflict. To do that, a brief review of James D. 
Fearon’s work will be presented.95 By using a rationalist approach, Fearon tried 
to explain how a bargaining failure between states could lead them to a military 
conflict. He concluded that there are the three main reasons that lead states to 
violence. First, if one of the states believes that a military conflict will not be 
costly for it, then it does not have any reason to negotiate a peaceful resolution of 
the dispute. Second, there is a chance that one of the states will miscalculate the 
outcome of a conflict due to wrong or misleading private information concerning 
the military capabilities and intentions of the rival state. Third, if there is a feeling 
of mistrust among the political leaders of the two conflicting states, then it is 
 
92 Mansfield and Pevehouse, “Preferential Trading Arrangements,” 798. 
93 Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Peter Rosendorff, “Why Democracies 
Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements,” International 
Organization 56, no.3 (2002): 477–513. 
94 David H. Bearce, and Sawa Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions Promote Peace?” 
Journal of Peace Research 42, no.6 (November 2005): 659–678. 
95 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no.3 
(1995): 379–414. 
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expected that commitment problems will emerge that will hinder the efforts for 
cooperation and will probably lead to a military conflict. 
 
Cause of military conflict according to 
Fearon’s rational bargaining model 
Explanation for peace based on the “trade 
produce peace” hypothesis 
States prefer to solve their problems by war 
because they believe that it is a low cost 
solution. 
Economic interdependence raises the costs 
of a military conflict. 
Ambiguous private information concerning the 
capabilities and intentions of the opponent lead 
to a miscalculation of the outcome of the 
potential conflict. 
Economic interdependence provides secure 
information concerning the capabilities and 
intentions of the interacting states. 
Commitment problems cause mistrust between 
state leaders and thus cooperation is 
obstructed. The possibility of a military conflict is 
bigger(Word choice. Consider: increased). 
Economic interdependence brings high-
ranked state actors closer and creates a 
more trusting environment, which facilitates 
the peaceful resolution of disputes. 
Table 2.   How Economic Interdependence Promotes Peace 
The above-mentioned rationalist bargaining model is very helpful in 
understanding how economic interdependence via trade agreements and 
participation in common commercial institution can lead to peace. Again, there 
are three the main explanations. As Russett and Oneal argue, “individuals act 
rationally in accordance with their economic interests. It is hardly in a state’s 
interest to fight another if its citizens sell their goods, obtain imports, or have 
financial investments or investors there.”96 Hence, it is evident that economic 
interdependence raises the cost of a military conflict. In addition, bilateral trade 
combined with participation in joint commercial institutions is a good source of 
reliable information concerning the military capabilities of each state. Therefore, it 
reduces the risk of misperceiving the outcome of a conflict due to wrong 
information relevant to the capabilities and intentions of the opponent. Finally, 
“trade exposes a state’s citizens to the ideas and perspectives of citizens of other 
                                            
96 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 129. 
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countries on a wide range of issues.”97 This is also very useful, especially in the 
level of high ranking state actors, since through their scheduled meetings, 
conferences, etc., it is possible to develop relations based on mutual trust that 
will facilitate the bargaining procedure. As Bearce and Omori suggest, “a more 
trusting state leader becomes more willing to bargain for peace in the present.”98 
Table 3 summarizes the findings of this section. 
Nevertheless, many scholars support the view that economic interaction 
can also be a source of conflict.99 The possibility of military conflict is higher in 
dyads consisting of a powerful state and a much weaker economic partner. The 
imbalance between the military, economic and political capabilities of the two 
states can create dependency of the weaker state on the stronger. This 
dependency will give the stronger state the opportunity to take advantage of its 
power in order to enforce its own terms. Consequently, “conflict can arise 
because the weaker party resists what it sees as unfair treatment and 
exploitation or because the stronger state seeks to enforce its advantage.”100   
In the next section of this chapter, a comparison between the 
macroeconomic and trade indexes of Greece and Turkey will be made in order to 
evaluate whether the rapprochement policy that was initiated by Greece after 




97 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 130. 
98 Bearce and Omori, “How Do Commercial Institutions,” 664. 
99 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1977); John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in 
Europe after the Cold War,” International Security 15, no.1 (1990): 5–56. 
100 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 132. 
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B. THE GREEK-TURKISH ECONOMIC RELATIONS. DID THE OLD 
ADVERSARIES BECOME NEW PARTNERS 
In this section, an evaluation of the economic relations between Greece 
and Turkey after 1999 will be presented. It will become clear whether the post-
Helsinki policy of all the Greek governments, which was based on the 
Democratic Peace Theory, has any practical results in their bilateral economic 
cooperation. Thus, the hypothesis to be proven is that since Greece is trying to 
apply the Democratic Peace Theory in its relations with Turkey after 1999, the 
economic data of the two countries must show that their economic interactions 
are more intense, and thus the two countries are becoming interdependent in the 
economic sector. 
1. Economic Cooperation through the Ratification of Low Politics 
Agreements 
After the Helsinki Summit of 1999 and the initiation of the rapprochement 
procedure between Greece and Turkey, numerous agreements concerning their 
economic cooperation were signed. More specifically, “the two countries started 
a new policy of promoting cooperation on the so-called ‘low politics’ issues.”101 In 
this framework, the following ten bilateral agreements were signed by Greece 
and Turkey, and came into force in 2001: 
1) Agreement on cooperation in the field of tourism. 
2) Agreement on reciprocal promotion and protection of 
investments. 
3) Agreement on economic cooperation. 
4) Agreement on cooperation on mutual assistance between 
customs administrations. 
5) Agreement on cooperation in science and technology. 
 
101 Angelos Kotios and George Petrakos, “The Industrial and Trade Structure of the Greek 
and Turkish Economies: Possibilities for Cooperation,” in Greece and Turkey in the 21th Century: 
Conflict or Cooperation. A Political Economy Perspective, ed. Christos Kollias and Culay Cunluk-
Senesun (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 106. 
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6) Agreement on combating crime, especially in the fields of 
terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking, and illegal 
immigration. 
7) Agreement on maritime transport. 
8) Agreement on cooperation on environmental protection. 
9) Agreement on cultural cooperation. 
10) Protocol on technical, scientific and economic cooperation in 
the agricultural sector.102 
In addition, after 2001, three more agreements were signed by the two countries: 
Agreement on the avoidance of double taxation (January 1, 2005). 
Agreement on cooperation in the health sector (September 28, 
2005). 
Agreement on standardization, evaluation and testing (June 30, 
2006).103 
The above-mentioned agreements show that great emphasis is given to 
the sectors of industry, energy, agriculture, tourism, communications, 
transportations, investments, environment and health. These “low politics” 
agreements took into account the already existent regulation of the EU as well as 
the obligations that the two countries have related to those regulations. 
Therefore, the presence of the EU in the economic relations of the two countries 
is important. As long as the economic integration between Turkey and the EU is 
moving forward, the bilateral economic relation between Greece and Turkey 
must improve. Combined with the geographical proximity of the two countries, an 
acceleration of their bilateral trade must also be expected.  
 
102 Official website of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
http://old.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/turkey/bilateral.html (accessed 
October 10, 2009).  
103 Ibid. 
2. Analysis of the Data Concerning the Bilateral Economic 
Relations of Greece and Turkey 
After this brief review of the already signed bilateral trade agreements and 
comparison of Greece and Turkey’s economies, it is now useful to compare the 
data that are relevant with the bilateral trade of the two countries. In the following 
paragraphs, trade data concerning the period from 1996 to 2007 will be 
compared in order to examine the effect that the rapprochement policy of Greece 
had in the trade sector of the two economies. If during this period a substantial 
increase in the bilateral trade is observed then the likelihood of a conflict will be 
lower and the prospects for a peaceful resolution of their bilateral problems will 
be more feasible.  
The following analysis is based on data taken from the “Correlates of War 
Project.”104 In order to be consistent with the trade data, all the values are in U.S. 
dollars. In addition, according to Russett and Oneal’s work, “we expect trade to 
influence dyadic relations to the degree that it is economically important. Only 
then will the economic agents involved be politically powerful and motivated to 
influence national leaders.”105 Therefore, in order to calculate the economic 
importance of trade, an introduction of the following indexes has been made: 
Index Description 
HEX  Exports of Greece to Turkey 
HEM  Imports of Greece from Turkey 
HEBal  Balance of Trade between Greece and Turkey 
HEVol  Volume of Trade between Greece and Turkey 
HE(total)X  Total Exports of Greece 
HE(total)M  Total Imports of Greece 
HEX /  HE(total)X Turkish Share in Total Exports of Greece 
HEM /  HE(total)M Turkish Share in Total Imports from Greece 
Table 3.   Description of the Data Indexes  
                                            
104 Data are available at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/. 
105 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 140. 
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Year 
HEX =Exports of Greece 
to Turkey (mil USD) 
HEM =Imports of Greece 
from Turkey (mil USD) 
H EB al  HEVol  
1996 274.33 233.1 41.23 297.43 
1997 430.1 296.57 133.53 726.67 
1998 319.8 362.16 -42.36 681.96 
1999 287.56 264.64 22.92 552.2 
2000 430.81 391.25 39.56 822.06 
  2001 266.25 492.3 -226.05 758.55 
2002 312.46 600.9 -288.44 913.36 
2003 427.74 885.56 -457.82 1313.3 
2004 592.72 1235.81 -643.09 1828.53 
2005 726.65 1190.71 -464.06 1917.36 
2006 1041.23 1671.42 -630.19 2712.65 
2007 762.6 2057.1 -1294.5 2819.7 
 
Table 4.   Trade between Greece and Turkey.106 
A quick look at Figures 1 and 2 reveals that the trade relationship between 
the two countries has become enhanced, especially after 2002, following 
Turkey’s steady resurgence from the financial crisis that hit the country in 2001. 
As we can see in more detail in Table 4, in 1996 the trade volume (X+M) 
between Greece and Turkey was at 297.43 million USD. In 2002, this value had 
more than tripled, reaching 913.36 million USD, and by the end of 2007 it had 
more than tripled again, reaching 2819.7 million USD. However, in order to 
evaluate the economic importance of trade, an examination of the indexes 
X/XGR and M/MGR must be conducted107. From Tables 4 and 5, it is evident 
that despite the rapprochement procedure in the context of the EU, the two 
countries’ bilateral trade remains at a low level. The Turkish share in total Greek 
exports (X/XGR), even though having a faintly increasing trend since 1996, 
remains at the low value of 3.23 percent. On the other hand, the Turkish share in 
Greece’s total imports (M/MGR) has almost tripled since 1996 but it also remains 
at the low-level value of 2.72 percent.  
 
                                            
106 From Source: Correlates of War Project. Trade Data Set. 


























1996 11949 28744.8 2.29% 0.81% 0.081 
1997 11129.5 27046.3 3.86% 1.09% 0.183 
1998 10733.7 28742.5 2.97% 1.26% -0.062 
1999 10477.3 28016.8 2.74% 0.94% 0.041 
2000 10974.6 28323.5 3.92% 1.38% 0.048 
2001 9710 28161 2.74% 1.74% -0.298 
2002 10331.6 31318.8 3.02% 1.91% -0.315 
2003 13379 44853.2 3.19% 1.97% -0.348 
2004 15336.2 52633.3 3.86% 2.34% -0.351 
2005 17144 53989.3 4.23% 2.20% -0.242 
2006 20364.7 63227.7 5.11% 2.64% -0.232 
2007 23574 75553 3.23% 2.72% -0.459 
Table 5.   Trade between Greece and Turkey.108 
In order to get a clearer picture of the level of economic interdependence 
between the two countries, we will examine the importance of trade partners to 
the two countries. According to Turkish statistics for the year 2007, Greece keeps 
the 11th position as an export market for Turkish products.109 In 2007, Turkey’s 
total exports valued 107271.7 million USD, of this amount only 2057.1 million 
USD went to Greece. Iraq and Bulgaria are in the 10th and 12th positions 
respectively as export markets for Turkish products. These two countries have a 
lower GDP than Greece. In particular, Bulgaria’s GDP is only 10.9 percent of 
Greece.110 For the same year, 2007, the value of Turkish imports from Greece 
was only 762.6 million USD out of 169,987 million USD imports. Greece was in 
the 34th position, while Israel was at the 33th and Canada at the 35th position in 
terms of the countries that import goods from Turkey. 
 
                                            
108 From Source: Correlates of War Project. Trade Data Set. 
109 Data available in the Turkish Statistical Institute, Turkstat, at 
http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?tb_id=12&ust_id=4 (accessed October 21, 2009). 






























Figure 1.   Trade between Greece and Turkey. 
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Figure 2.   Trade between Greece and Turkey. 
On the other hand, Turkey seems to be a more important trade partner 
since during 2007, it had the 9th place as an export market for Greek products, 
receiving 3.23 percent of Greece’s total exports (Table 5). In the same year, the 
Greek imports from Turkey placed it in the 11th position among the countries that 
import goods to Greece.111 Therefore, as seen again in Table 4, the bilateral 
trade balance is in Turkey’s favor. Furthermore, as Figure 1 shows, the trade 
balance deficit of Greece concerning its bilateral trade relations with Turkey is 
continuously growing.   
Moreover, Figure 3 shows that the level of competitiveness of Greece’s 
economy weighed against Turkey’s economy has been worsening since 1996.  
 
                                            
111 From Source: Pan-Hellenic Union of Exporters. Data available at 
http://www.pse.gr/stats.asp (accessed October 24, 2009). 
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More specifically, the index became negative in 2001 and since then continues to 
deteriorate with the last available value for 2007 equal to -0.459, which is the 
lowest value since 1996. 
 



























Figure 3.   Index of Greek Competitiveness in its Trade Relations with Turkey.  
Therefore, the overall picture seems to be a little disappointing. The data 
indicate low volumes of trade between the two countries for the period 1999-
2007. It seems that the rapprochement procedure that Greece initiated after the 
Helsinki Summit of 1999 does not have any substantial effect on the bilateral 
trade relations. Thus, one of the three pillars of the Democratic Peace Theory, 
namely, economic interdependence, cannot be applied satisfactorily in the dyad 
of Greece and Turkey. The fact that the two countries are different in terms of 
size (economy, population, etc.) does not have any effect since Russett and 
Oneal proved that, “economically important trade between large states and small 
states increases the prospects for peace just as it does for states of equal 
size.”112  
                                            
112 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 147. 
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In order to clarify further the causes of this slow development of economic 
relations between two countries like Greece and Turkey, which have close 
geographical proximity and lengthy common borders, we will examine how open 
the markets of the two countries are. This is best done by calculating each 
country’s total exports plus total imports divided by its GDP. Thus, we will 
examine the economies of   the two countries in the period from 1999-2007 to 
see if they became more open. If this is true, then the possibilities for a peaceful 
coexistence between the two countries are increasing because, as Russett and 
Oneal proved, “countries that are open to external economic relations are 
constrained from using force even against rivals with whom commercial ties are 
limited.”113   
Trade data from the Correlates of War Project will once again be used. All 
the values are again in millions [USD]. The following indexes will be analyzed: 
 
Index Description 
GR The Sum of Greece’s Total Exports and Imports. 
TU The Sum of Turkey’s Total Exports and Imports. 
GR/GDP  Openness of Greece’s economy. 
TU/GDP  Openness of Turkey’s economy. 
Table 6.   Description of the Data Indexes 
The data that are necessary for testing the previous hypothesis are 
presented in Table 7. 
Year GR (mil USD) TU (mil USD) GR/GDP TU/GDP 
1999 38494.1 67256.6 0.27929 0.26922 
2000 39298.1 77271.8 0.30797 0.29002 
2001 37871 72722.3 0.28877 0.3719 
2002 41650.4 87599 0.28159 0.37713 
2003 58232.2 116571.8 0.30042 0.38439 
2004 67969.5 160329.2 0.29415 0.40879 
2005 71133.3 190013.3 0.2889 0.39366 
2006 83592.4 223761 0.31225 0.42284 
2007 99127 277141 0.31695 0.42695 
Table 7.   Openness of Greece and Turkey’s Economies. 
                                            
113 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 148.  
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It is evident that the Turkish economy is more open than the Greek 
economy. During the first year of the Greco-Turkish rapprochement (1999), 
Greece had a more open economy than Turkey (0.27929 against 0.26922). 
However, after 2001, the picture changed and the Turkish economy became 
more open than the Greek economy. The positive element of this analysis is that 
both countries managed to have a continuous increase of the openness index of 
their economies (the total trade-to GDP ratio). This phenomenon, according to 
Russett and Oneal’s research, is associated with a reduced risk of conflict. In 
their words, this finding “indicates that states recognize the consequences of 
militarized disputes for their economic relations with third parties.”114 In the case 
of Greece and Turkey, this implies that since both countries are becoming open 
economies with time, even when their bilateral trade does not have an analogous 
increase as the data shows, “they will be constrained by wider economic forces 
from taking military action.”115 The great improvement of the openness index of 
the Turkish economy means also that Turkey is moving quickly towards its 
economic integration with the EU. Unfortunately, this trend cannot be observed in 
Turkey’s economic relations with Greece. Despite the fact that there are some 
signs of increased economic activity in absolute numbers (see Figure 1 and 2) 
between the two countries, the analysis of their bilateral trade data shows that 
their economic relations remain limited. Consequently, both countries perform 
relatively poorly in terms of their economic interdependence. Hence, the 
conclusion is that according to the data up to 2007, “it is highly unlikely that 
economic relations will become so advanced in any domain as to assume a 
position of primacy in the bilateral relationship as a whole.”116 In addition, since 
the two countries are not interdependent in the economic sector, the political 
influence of the domestic economic interests in both countries will not be 
powerful enough. Given that the volume trade between the two countries 
 
114 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 154. 
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constitutes a small share of their national income, as Tables 4 and 5 indicate, the 
influential commercial interests in both countries will lack the political motivation 
to maintain good relations. Therefore, the economic interdependence pillar of the 
Democratic Peace Theory becomes weaker. 
It seems that the rapprochement policy that Greece adopted after 1999 
did not have the desirable results, at least in the economic sector. There is no 
meaning in examining which country is more responsible for the limited increase 
in their economic interactions during the period from 1999 to 2007. The fact is 
that both countries did not reach the expected threshold in their bilateral 
economic activities, beyond which the created economic interdependence would 
facilitate the establishment of the virtuous circles that are necessary for the 
peaceful resolution of their bilateral problematic issues.  
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V. THE PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to examine if the second pillar of the Democratic 
Peace Theory, namely democracy, can explain the peaceful relations between 
Greece and Turkey after 1999, which was the year that Greece decided to  
support Turkey’s European aspirations. Furthermore, this chapter will provide to 
the reader an epigrammatic factual background of the efforts that Turkey has 
made, up to nowadays, for accession in the European family and how Greece, as 
a permanent member of the European Union, reacted to these efforts.  
Starting this chapter from the democratic pillar of the Democratic Peace 
Theory, is necessary to clarify that democratic consolidation means that 
democracy “becomes the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting 
outside the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again 
within the same institutions under which they have just lost.”117 Since it is evident 
that Greece, after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, is trying to apply the Democratic 
Peace Theory in its relations with Turkey, there was a hope among the Greek 
politicians that Turkey would become more democratic through the negotiation 
process with the EU. Turkey will have to fulfill the political criteria for accession 
as described by the Copenhagen criteria. As Grigoriadis noted, in order for 
Turkey to comply effectively and fully with the Copenhagen criteria, a 
transformation of Turkish political culture was necessary. He further stated, 
“citizens and state would have to modify their view of each other as well as their 
role in society.”118 
 
 
117 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market. Political and Economic Reforms in 
Eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26. 
118 Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization. Turkish Political Culture and the 
European Union (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 32. 
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When the EU adopted the Copenhagen Criteria, it sent a clear message to 
all the states interested in becoming EU members. If a state desires to become a 
member of the European family, it had to adopt the principal of political 
liberalism. Political liberalism advocates civil rights for all citizens irrespective of 
nationality, gender or class. Moreover, political liberalism is promoting the 
equality of all the citizens before the law and it considers the establishment of the 
rule of law as an indispensable part of the society. In addition, it gives great 
importance to the existence of an independent judiciary and does not favor the 
intervention of the state in any sector of the society.  
Given these conditions, Greece as a status-quo country that desires 
peace and prosperity in its region had as the main motive for the support of 
Turkey’s accession efforts the fact that “the influence of democratization is 
usually to lower the risk of disputes.”119 Especially after the “Imia crisis” during 
1996 that brought the two countries close to a full-scale conflict, Greece’s 
political leaders understood that “the political character of the less democratic 
state in each dyad is primarily responsible for determining the likelihood of 
conflict.”120 In the Greco-Turkish dyad, the less democratic state during that 
period was Turkey.121 Hence, the only peaceful way for Greece to avoid similar 
problems with Turkey in the future was to pin its hopes entirely on Turkey’s 
accession-driven Europeanization. Risse defines Europeanization as “the 
emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance.”122 Officially, Turkey entered the process of Europeanization after 
the Helsinki Summit of 1999. As Papadopoulos noted, “In the Greek view, the 
EU, with its offer of a common, comprehensive vision in which states’ freedom of 
 
119 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 120. 
120 Ibid., 114. 
121 This statement is based on data that will be presented in the following section of this 
chapter. 
122 Thomas Risse, Maria Green Cowles, and James Caporaso, “Europeanization and 
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action is moderated by certain binding, yet ultimately fundamentally cooperative 
rules, provides the kind of setting that renders the incentives to a peaceful 
resolution of disputes overwhelmingly attractive.”123 
B. EU AND TURKEY. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
1. Period Prior to the Helsinki European Council (December 1999)  
Turkey’s efforts to join the EU officially started in 1963 with the signature 
of the Ankara (or Association) Agreement, and continued with an Additional 
Protocol signed in November 1970. Both of these agreements determined the 
main objectives of the Turkey-EU relation, which were the continuous and 
balanced strengthening of their commercial and economic relations along with 
the creation of a custom union in three stages. 
Unfortunately, for Turkey, the military coup in September 1980 had 
severely hampered EU-Turkey relations for almost five years. In 1987, during the 
Ozal administration, Turkey filed a formal application for membership that was 
rejected in 1989 by the Commission with the justification that it had not yet 
reached the appropriate economic level. These seven wasted years were crucial 
for Turkey because it lost the chance to be included in the EU’s enlargements 
procedures of 1981 and 1986. On the other hand, Greece succeeded in joining 
the EU as a full member in 1981. Furthermore, in 1990, the Republic of Cyprus 
submitted an application for full membership in the EU. In 1993, the Commission 
argued that the only issue preventing the entrance of Cyprus into the EU as a full 
member was the unresolved issue of the de facto partition of the island because 
of the Turkish invasion of 1974, and subsequently the inability to accomplish a 
viable constitutional settlement with the North (occupied) part of the island. 
However, the Commission stated that it would reexamine Cyprus’ application in 
January 1995, waiting for the results of the ongoing negotiations sponsored by 
the United Nations concerning this issue. 
 
123 Papadopoulos, “Economic Cooperation,” 312. 
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Greece did not stay out of the EU-Cyprus negotiations, and during the 
European Council meeting in the Greek island of Corfu (June 24–25, 1994), it 
managed to pass some important statements in the document of the Presidency 
Conclusions.  In particular the European Council noted, regarding Cyprus, that, 
“an essential stage in the preparation process could be regarded as completed” 
and that “in these conditions the next phase of enlargement of the Union will 
involve Cyprus.”124 It is widely accepted that politics in the EU level is a give-
and-take procedure. EU’s history is filled with examples of tough bargaining 
between the member states. Therefore, Greece cannot be the exception to that 
rule. Almost one and a half years later, in December 1995, Greece supported by 
its vote the establishment of a custom union between EU and Turkey, and 
received in exchange for its “good” behavior a fixed date for the launching of 
Cyprus’ accession negotiations with the EU.125 However, serious concerns over 
the economic performance of Turkey, along with the fear of an increased 
migration rate (due to freedom of movement within the EU), forced the European 
countries to reject an immediate full mem
An additional unpleasant surprise for Turkey was the Commission’s 
publishing of the “Agenda 2000.” According to this document, which was 
describing the main axes of EU policy for the period 2000-2006, EU was planning 
to proceed with the enlargement procedure in two steps126. Cyprus was included 
in the first of the two steps, but Turkey was excluded even from the second step 
of the enlargement. During the Luxembourg Summit of December 1997, the 
European Council verified the Commission’s proposal, thus deciding to put off 
Turkey’s full membership indefinitely by denying granting Turkey the status of a 
 
124 Corfu European Council Presidency Conclusions (24–25 June 1994), pg.10. The 
document with the Conclusions of the Presidency can be accessed through the following link: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EUROPEAN%20COUNCIL%20AT%20CORF
U%20-%20Presidency%20conclusions.pdf (accessed August 24, 2009). 
125 In particular, the accession negotiations between the EU and Cyprus would be opened 
six months after the completion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. 
126 The first group of candidate states consisted of Cyprus, Estonia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia and the Czech Republic; while the second one included Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Slovakia. 
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candidate member. “The Commission cited Turkey’s macroeconomic instability, 
poor record on human rights, continuing disputes with Greece in the Aegean, and 
failure to promote restoration of constitutional order in Cyprus.”127 However, the 
EU did not want to close all the doors to Turkey and in order to prove its good 
intentions concerning Turkey’s European aspirations, it issued a Communication 
paper that described a program “of financial, technical, and legal assistance to 
help Turkey consolidate its customs union and to harmonize its legislative regime 
with that of the EU.”128 Furthermore, the European Council asked the 
Commission to prepare the “European Strategy for Turkey” which would be the 
base for the development and progress of EU-Turkey relations.129 In addition, 
the European Council decided to start the accession negotiations with the first 
group of candidate states, in which Cyprus was included, on March 30, 199
It is clear that Turkey was not very pleased with the outcome of the 
Luxembourg Summit. Greece was already a full member of the EU and a strong 
candidate for entrance in the Euro zone. Cyprus updated its relations with the EU 
by initiating accession negotiations, and on the other hand, Turkey’s relations 
with the EU, after the Luxembourg Summit, reached its lowest level. In contrast 
to Greece and Cyprus, Turkey’s future path towards Europe seemed long and 
uncertain. 
Greece’s stance, until the Helsinki European Council of December 1999, 
concerning Turkey’s desire to become a member of the European family was not 
supportive. In fact, in numerous cases, Greece became the main obstacle to 
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1998). The entire document can be accessed through the following link: 
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Turkey’s effort for the establishment of closer relations with the EU. In particular, 
right after the Luxembourg Summit, Turkey threatened to abandon the efforts for 
joining the EU if it did not receive the status of a candidate country during the 
Cardiff Summit of June 1998. Additionally, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Ismail Cem, stated that Turkey would not participate in London’s European 
Conference of March 12, 1998, under the United Kingdom’s Presidency.131 The 
reaction of Turkey did not affect Greece’s decision to keep vetoing its candidacy. 
Even the personal phone call of U.S. President Bill Clinton to Greek Prime 
Minister Kostas Simitis, urging him to lift the Greek veto toward Turkey during the 
Cardiff Summit, did not manage to alter the Greek stance.132 During the Cardiff 
Summit, Greece kept on with its policy of blocking any financial help from the EU 
to Turkey, with the justification that a country that spends enormous amount of 
money in order to maintain 25 thousand troops in the occupied North part of 
Cyprus, does not need any financial assistance. Even when the Commission 
proposed the approval of a 135 million euro development aid package to Turkey, 
which could be approved not by a unanimous decision but by majority voting so 
that the evident Greek veto could be bypassed, the Greek government warned 
the Commission that it would send the case to the European Court of Justice.133 
At the same time, Cyprus officially opened the accession negotiations with 
the EU (March 31, 1998) despite the objections that some EU member states 
had concerning the ability of the Greek-Cypriot government to apply the acquis 
communautaire to the divided island.134 Summarizing this section, we can 
conclude that besides Turkey’s efforts to join the EU, Greece kept an obstructive 
 
131 Pia Christina Wood, “Europe and Turkey; A Relationship Under Fire,” Mediterranean 
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134 France, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands feared that since Cyprus was still divided 
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accession negotiations with Cyprus until a viable solution can be found regarding this issue. 
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did not have the same treatment with the rest of the candidate countries. 
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stance and simultaneously did its best to promote the candidacy of Cyprus. At 
the end of 1998, no one could imagine the shift of the Greek policy during the 
Helsinki Summit of 1999.   
2. Period of Greco-Turkish Rapprochement (1999 to the present) 
Turkey’s road towards the EU opened again during the meeting of the 
European Council in Helsinki. In December 1999, the European states agreed to 
grant Turkey the status of a candidate country. The most surprising fact during 
that meeting was Greece’s decision to adopt a positive and supportive stance 
towards Turkey’s European aspirations. As the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs 
stated, “Greece believes that if Turkey is willing to submit to the rigors of the 
process of candidacy, which apply equally to all candidate countries, then it 
should be accepted into the EU.”135 This change of stance did not happen all of 
a sudden. The climate between the two countries started to improve after the 
August earthquakes in Turkey that cost the lives of about seventeen thousand 
citizens. One of the first countries that offered help to the Turkish authorities was 
Greece. This unexpected disaster “has given moderate Greek leaders the cover 
they need to start normalizing relations with Turkey.”136 Furthermore, almost one 
month after the disastrous earthquakes in Turkey, the same fate hit Athens, but 
in a smaller scale. The powerful earthquake caused the death of 143 people. It 
was now Turkey’s turn to reciprocate the aid to Greece.  
These successive and disastrous earthquakes gave birth to the so-called 
“earthquake diplomacy,” which in its turn generated sentiments of friendship and 
solidarity between the Greeks and the Turks. As the Greek Minister of Foreign 
Affairs stated, “…the earthquake created an amazing climate. Because of this 
 
135 George Papandreou, “Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade,” The New York Times, 
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136 Martin Fletcher, “Quake softens Greek stance on ancient foe,” The Times, September 7, 
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tragedy there was a human warmth that came out between the two peoples.”137 
This “amazing” climate was the chance that Greece was looking for in order to 
initiate its rapprochement policy toward Turkey without paying a severe political 
cost in the domestic field.   
Despite this friendly atmosphere between the two countries, Turkey’s road 
toward the EU was not going to be easy. The “rigors” to which Turkey had to 
submit at that time could be described by the Copenhagen Criteria, which had 
already been established since 1993. According to these criteria, every state that 
wants to become a part of the EU must fulfill the following conditions:   
the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities, 
the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the European Union, and 
the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.138 
Nevertheless, Greece’s determination to promote Cyprus’ accession to the 
EU and to disconnect the solution of the Cyprus issue from the EU’s enlargement 
procedures was evident in the Presidency Conclusions of the Helsinki European 
Council. More specifically the following paragraph officially locked Cyprus’ 
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The European Council underlines that a political settlement will 
facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the EU. If no settlement has 
been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the 
Council’s decision on accession will be made without the above 
being a precondition. In this, the Council will take account of all the 
relevant factors.139 
The message that the 15 European states sent to Turkey was very clear: 
a political solution that would put an end to the division of Cyprus by the Turkish 
Armed Forces must be found in the near future. If this cannot be accomplished, 
then Cyprus will become a member of the EU even if the island is still divided. 
Consequently, Turkey, which after the invasion of 1974 “illegally occupies the 
Northern part of the island, can no longer block the accession of Cyprus to the 
EU.”140 For the Turkish side, this was a very unpleasant development because 
now, in addition to all the other difficulties that they had to overcome in order to 
become a member of the EU, they also had to take into account the possibility of 
a Greek-Cypriot veto. In addition, the Helsinki European Council granted the 
status of a candidate state to Turkey, but it did not determine a specific date for 
the opening of the official accession negotiations.  
After the initial shock, the Turkish officials realized that compared to their 
country, Cyprus was advancing very rapidly in its efforts for accession in the EU. 
Therefore, they decided to accept the candidacy status, but at the same time, 
they adopted a more aggressive stance toward the members of the EU. More 
specifically, on May 29, 2001 the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) made 
the following statement, “the full-membership of Southern Cyprus to the 
European Union as a result of its unilateral application will deepen the division in 
the island. Besides, peace and stability in Eastern Mediterranean will encounter 
 
139 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions (10–11 December 1999), paragraph 
9b. The entire document can be accessed through the following link: 
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uncertainties as a result of such a development.”141 In addition to the above-
mentioned threats for instability in the region, Turkish officials in the same 
statement took a step further and warned the EU that it is very possible to annex 
the occupied northern part of Cyprus. “As a guarantor country, Turkey, within the 
framework of its commitments stemming from agreements and history, will 
continue to take every necessary step for prosperity and security of the Turkish 
Cypriot people and to make economic contributions, and it will speed up its 
efforts to strengthen and deepen the cooperation with the TRNC.”142 
Moreover, some high-ranking Turkish public officials supported the view 
that the EU must get the permission of Ankara before any decision to accept the 
Republic of Cyprus as a member of the European family. The statement of State 
Minister Sukru Sina Gurel on state channel TRT 1 is characteristic of Turkey’s 
view regarding the Cyprus issue. Namely, he asserted, “Cyprus' membership 
depends on Turkey and they should become EU members at the same time."143 
Despite the angry reaction of Turkey and the verbal threats that it would 
withdraw its application if the Republic of Cyprus entered the EU, the negotiation 
talks between Cyprus and EU, which had started in 1998, continued at the same 
pace. However, both the EU and the UN made efforts to promote a solution to 
the Cyprus issue before Republic of Cyprus’ signing of the EU Accession Treaty 
in April 2003. The longing for the accession of a united Cyprus in the EU was 
catholic. The negotiations started in January 2002 under the auspices of UN 
Secretary General Kofi Annan. By the time the accession negotiations ended at 
the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, no commonly accepted 
solution had been reached. Therefore, the EU announced the official invitation of 
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the Republic of Cyprus to enter the EU. Furthermore, during the negotiations that 
took place in Hague on March 10, 2003, between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities, a new stalemate was reached. Rauf Denktash, the leader of the 
Turkish Cypriots stated, “The plan was unacceptable for us. This was not a plan 
we could ask our people to vote for,”144 and as a result, the talks terminated.145 
Despite the stalemate in the negotiations concerning the resolution of the 
Cyprus issue, the EU continued the accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus 
and issued the “Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003.” According to this 
Protocol, “the application of the acquis shall be suspended in those areas of the 
Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not 
exercise effective control.”146 Moreover, the EU stated clearly that the above-
mentioned suspension would not affect the personal rights of Turkish Cypriots as 
EU citizens because they “are citizens of a Member State, the Republic of 
Cyprus, even though they may live in the northern part of Cyprus, the areas not 
under government control.”147 Finally, on May 1, 2004, the Republic of Cyprus 
signed its official entrance in the EU and two months later, the Annan Plan 
ceased to be an option for a possible reunion of Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot 
Community, after a referendum held on April 24, 2004, did not accept the fifth 
version of the Annan Plan and thus the plan became null.148  
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The entrance of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU without a prior 
settlement of the de facto division of the island was not a positive development 
for Turkey. First, the Republic of Cyprus as a permanent member of the EU will 
be capable of putting additional obstacles to the efforts of Turkey for accession 
since it will have full veto rights. Additionally, as the European Commission 
representative, Jean-Christophe Filori, observed, “We will be facing this rather 
weird situation where a candidate country knocking at the door does not  
recognize one of our own member states," which  will have as a result that “it will 
appear difficult in this situation to envisage the start of accession negotiations 
with Turkey.”149 
Meanwhile, the European Council at the Copenhagen Summit of 
December 2002 did not set a specific date for the commencement of the 
accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. However, at the next 
European Council Summit of December 2004, the member states decided to set 
a date for the start EU-Turkey accession negotiations. This date was October 3, 
2005. Turkey had only one thing to do before the commencement of the 
accession negotiations, and that was to sign the Additional Protocol to the 
Association Agreement. By ratifying the Additional Protocol, Turkey would extend 
the Association Agreement, which was initially signed in 1963, to the ten new 
member states that had joined the EU after the completion of the 2004 
enlargement procedure. One of the ten new member states was the Republic of 
Cyprus, which until that time (and since 1963) had not been officially recognized 
as an independent state by Turkey. and a trade embargo (by Turkey) was still in 
force against it. The EU’s desire was for Turkey to sign this Protocol before the 
start of its accession negotiations. Indeed, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol 
to the Association Agreement on July 29, 2005. Nevertheless, on the same day 
Turkey issued a “Declaration on Cyprus” emphasizing that, “signature, ratification 
and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of 
the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol; nor prejudice Turkey’s rights 
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and obligations emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance, 
and the Treaty of Establishment of 1960.”150 
This statement provoked many objections, especially from France, Austria 
and, of course, Greece and Cyprus. In order to mollify the distressed member 
states, the EU responded by issuing, on September 21, 2005, a separate 
declaration in which it stated in paragraphs 2 and 3 that,  
The European Community and its Member States make clear that 
this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the 
Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the 
Protocol.  
The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-
discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the 
removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including 
restrictions on means of transport. Turkey must apply the Protocol 
fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and 
evaluate full implementation in 2006. The European Community 
and its Member States stress that the opening of negotiations on 
the relevant chapters depends on Turkey’s implementation of its 
contractual obligations to all Member States. Failure to implement 
its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the 
negotiations.151 
It was clear that the EU was trying to remind to Turkey that if its political 
leadership had decided not to go along with the rules and obligations that are 
common for all the candidate states, then the negotiation process would be very 
long and uncertain. Until the signing of the Negotiation Framework Protocol on 
October 3, 2005, Turkey had not implemented the Additional Protocol regarding 
its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. Despite this fact, Greece and Cyprus 
had not raised any objections concerning the signing of the Negotiation 
Framework Protocol by Turkey, mainly because the text of the Protocol, besides 
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the Copenhagen Criteria, included some additional conditions that Turkey must 
fulfill. These conditions were relevant to the resolution of the Cyprus issue and to 
the problematic Greek-Turkish relations. The exact words of these additional 
conditions were the following: 
Turkey's unequivocal commitment to good neighborly relations and 
its undertaking to resolve any outstanding border disputes in 
conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in 
accordance with the United Nations Charter, including if necessary 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice;152 
Turkey's continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in 
line with the principles on which the Union is founded, including 
steps to contribute to a favorable climate for a comprehensive 
settlement, and progress in the normalization of bilateral relations 
between Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic 
of Cyprus. 
the fulfillment of Turkey's obligations under the Association 
Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Association 
Agreement to all new EU Member States, in particular those 
pertaining to the EU-Turkey customs union, as well as the 
implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly 
revised.153 
 
Unfortunately, Turkey did not alter its foreign policy toward Greece and 
Cyprus. However, regarding the fulfillment of Turkey’s obligation under the 
Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU members 
(including Cyprus), Ankara played its last card by proposing to Cyprus free 
access to only one port and one airport facility in the Turkish-occupied part of 
Cyprus and not in Turkey. More specifically, Turkey proposed to open for direct 
trade, and only for twelve months, Famagusta’s port and Ercan’s airport, which 
 
152 This condition is clearly implying the dispute between the two countries concerning the 
Aegean Sea. 
153 European Union, Negotiating Framework for Turkey: Principles Governing the 
Negotiations (European Union: Brussels, 2005), para.6. The entire document can be accessed 
through the following link: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf 
(accessed October 12, 2009).  
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was used until that time only for flights between the Northern, occupied, part of 
Cyprus and Turkey. Unfortunately, for Turkey, the Additional Protocol required 
that not one, but all the ports and airports must be opened in order to facilitate 
free trade. 
As was expected, the response from Cyprus was negative. The Greek 
Cypriot foreign minister, George Lillikas, succinctly described Cyprus’ view 
regarding Turkey’s proposal by saying, “It is a mockery of the EU since it lacks 
any serious content.”154 Furthermore, Greek Cypriot President Tassos 
Papadopoulos added that, “Turkey should realize that it cannot push its way into 
the EU as it did with Cyprus in 1974.”155 Greece also backed Cyprus’ position by 
emphasizing the fact that Turkey had to open all its ports and airports for Cyprus’ 
commercial fleet and not only one. In addition, “Greek Foreign Ministry 
spokesmen, Georgios Koumoutsakos, described the proposal as vague and 
open to multiple interpretations.”156 
On the other hand, Britain welcomed the Turkish proposal and Tony Blair, 
the British Prime Minister, “has warned the EU against sending a negative signal 
to Turkey.”157 Moreover, Finland stated that the proposal was moving in the 
correct direction, thus it was encouraging for the future but not enough. Germany 
kept a neutral stance by proposing the arrangement of a new deadline for the 
application of the Additional Protocol by Turkey. Despite all the abovementioned 
contradicted opinions, on December 21, 2006, after a recommendation by the 
European Commission, the EU decided to suspend the negotiations with Turkey 
 
154 Nicholas Watt, “EU summit row looms over Turkish plan to break deadlock in talks: Greek 
Cypriots dismiss limited opening of ports: Athens calls for tougher sanctions on membership,” 
The Guardian, December 8, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/turkey?page=35 (accessed 
September 15, 2009). 
155 Andrew Borowiec, “Port offer not enough for Greece, Cyprus; Nations vow to block EU 
entry,” The Washington Times, December 11, 2006, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ (accessed 
September 15, 2009).  
156 Watt. “EU summit row.” 
157 Borowiec. “Port offer not enough.” 
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on eight of the 35 chapters158 of the acquis communautaire. Moreover, the EU 
decided to prohibit any provisional closing of the already ten opened chapters159 
until the Commission confirmed that Turkey has fully implemented the Additional 
Protocol to the Association Agreement. The main justification for this decision 
was the lack of progress concerning the Cyprus issue. Furthermore, EU informed 
Turkey that at the end of 2009, it would decide the fate of the eight chapters that 
have not yet been opened. 
It is useful to make a short reference here to the idea of a “special 
relationship” or “privileged partnership” between the EU and Turkey instead of a 
full membership. The current Prime Minister of Germany, Mrs. Merkel, was the 
first European political leader to propose this idea. Mrs. Merkel made her 
intentions clear even before the Christian Democratic Party won the September 
2005 national elections. “In a letter to the EU’s conservative heads of 
government Mrs. Merkel said negotiations with Turkey should not automatically 
lead to membership. They should instead lead to a privileged partnership and 
should be open-ended.”160 Since then, Germany has been a strong supporter of 
the privileged partnership argument. 
The other great opponent of Turkey’s European efforts is France. As early 
as 2005 and almost at the same time as Mrs. Merkel objections regarding 
Turkey’s accession talks, French President Jacques Chirac criticized Turkey’s 
decision to sign the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and kept 
insisting that it will not recognize Cyprus. President Chirac’s exact words were 
that, “this declaration poses political and legal problems and that it is not in the 
 
158 The eight chapters are, Free Movements of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom 
to Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport 
Policy, Customs Union and External Relations. 
159 The ten chapters that have already opened are the following: Company Law, Intellectual 
Property Law, Information Society and Media, Taxation, Economic and Monetary Policy, 
Statistics, Enterprise and Industrial Policy, Trans-European Networks, Financial Control and 
Consumer and Health Protection. 
160 Nicholas Watt and Luke Harding, “Turkey’s EU dream double blow as Chirac and Merkel 
raise doubts,” The Guardian, August 27, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/aug/27/turkey.eu (accessed September 16, 2009).  
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spirit expected of a candidate to the union.”161 The next president of France also 
moved in the same direction concerning Turkey’s ambitions to enter the EU. 
More specifically, during his visit in Washington in September 2006, Mr. Sarkozy 
stated the following: 
I have often been asked about the place of Muslims in France, 
because of concern in the United States. My dear friends, let us be 
consistent. What is the point of worrying about our ability to 
integrate Muslims in France or in Europe if at the same time, and 
just as forcefully, the United States asks us to accept Turkey in 
Europe? Even if you consider that we have a problem with Islam, in 
which case you have to give us time to find the ways and means to 
create a European Islam and reject an Islam in Europe. But don’t 
then give equal support to the integration of a country like Turkey, 
with 75 million inhabitants. Consistency is part of the relations 
between Europe and the United States.162   
With this statement in mind, Mr. Sarkozy’s reaction to U.S. President 
Barack Obama’s suggestions right after his visit to Turkey in April 2009 was 
something that must have been expected by everyone. During his first official 
meeting with the leaders of the EU in Prague, Mr. Obama suggested that, “the 
US and Europe must approach Muslims as our friends, neighbors and partners in 
fighting injustice, intolerance and violence. Moving forward toward Turkish 
membership in the EU would be an important signal of your commitment to this 
agenda and ensure that we continue to anchor Turkey firmly in Europe.”163 Mr. 
Sarkozy’s response to this statement was immediate and clear, “I have been 





161 Watt and Harding, “Turkey’s EU dream.” 
162 Tulin Daloglou, “Debating Turkey and the EU; France continues cold shoulder,” The 
Washington Times, December 4, 2007, http://www.washingtontimes.com/ (accessed September 
15, 2009).  
163 Bruno Waterfield and Toby Harnden, “NATO; Sarkozy attacks US interference in EU,” 
The Daily Telegraph, April 6, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/ 
(accessed September 16, 2009). 
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to the member states to decide. I have always been opposed to this entry and I 
remain opposed. I think I can say that the immense majority of member states 
shares the position of France.”164 
At this point, it will be useful to make a short reference to the findings of 
the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV) and Istituto Affari 
Internazionali (IAI) joint project named “Talking Turkey.” The conclusions of this 
research will facilitate us in understanding that “each member state holds 
different views for different reasons on the Turkey question . . . and the reasons 
for this are rooted in a diverse and dynamic set of interests and ideas.”165 The 
following table presents the findings of this project. We can see what each 
country considers as the most important issue regarding the efforts of Turkey to 
join the EU. For example, Greece believes that the main issues regarding the 
EU-Turkey debate are the sectors of Human Rights, Democracy and Security, 
Foreign Policy. As it mentioned in Chapter II, Greece believes that the resolution 
of the bilateral problems that exist between the two countries is a precondition for 
Turkey’s entrance to the EU. In addition, from Table 8 we can also see that many 
countries are also concerned about the economic consequences of Turkish 
entrance. Six countries, namely, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Poland and 
United Kingdom have second thoughts about how Turkey’s membership will 
affect the trade relations between the states of the EU, the EU budget and the 
distribution of EU’s funding. Moreover, keeping in mind that Turkey has a 
population of 75 million; the effect of the free circulation of people is going to 
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Austria Χ    Χ Χ 
Belgium  Χ χ Χ  Χ 
Denmark Χ  Χ  Χ  
Finland   Χ Χ   
France Χ Χ Χ Χ Χ Χ 
Germany Χ  Χ  Χ Χ 
Greece   Χ Χ   
Poland Χ χ  Χ  Χ 
Slovenia    Χ   
UK    χ  χ 
Table 8.   Core Topics Regarding Turkey’s EU Membership166  
Nevertheless, many EU members have expressed their full support to 
Turkey’s membership, and thus they do not adopt the views expressed by 
France and Germany. For example, Britain, Portugal, Sweden and some of the 
recent EU members from Eastern Europe have openly supported Turkey’s efforts 
for accession in the EU. However, the decision whether Turkey will become a 
member of the EU or not must have the unanimous support of all the EU’s 
governments.  
Finally, one factor that further complicated the relations between Turkey 
and EU was the political crisis that erupted in the country during 2008. Mr. 
Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is the governing party in 
Turkey, was accused by the Constitutional Court of violating Turkey’s secular 
constitution by supporting pro-Islamic activities. More specifically, the crisis 
began in June 2008 when “the court overturned a constitutional amendment 
allowing female university students to wear head scarves. To many in secular 
Turkey, the headscarf is an Islamic political symbol. Mr. Erdogan retorted that the 
court had no authority to examine constitutional amendments.”167 This 
accusation could lead to closing down of the AKP and exclusion of Prime 
                                            
166 Tocci, Talking Turkey, 6. 
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Minister Tayyip Erdogan from political activities for at least five years. This 
incident threatened the political stability of Turkey, a fact that did not promote in a 
positive way its accession negotiations with the EU. Nevertheless, the crisis 
ended when the Constitutional Court decided not to ban the AKP, but to only 
impose financial penalties. EU leaders reacted positively to the decision of the 
court because it eliminated one more barrier to Turkey’s already lengthy and 
problematic negotiations concerning its accession to the EU.  
To summarize this section and try to clear the picture concerning the triad 
of Greece, Cyprus and Turkey in the context of the EU, we can emphasize the 
following facts. Today Greece and Cyprus are both members of the EU with full 
veto rights and with both countries still having unsolved problematic issues with 
Turkey. Until the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece was strongly opposing the 
Turkish efforts for entrance in the EU. After 1999 and until now, Greece shifted 
its stance dramatically and followed a rapprochement policy toward Turkey. 
Turkey is trying to join the EU and one of the main obstacles to its accession is 
the Cyprus issue. However, up to now, Turkey has not raised the casus belli 
against Greece, has not recognized the Republic of Cyprus as an independent 
state, and has not fully implemented the Additional Protocol that was signed in 
2005. In addition, the European Commission in its last progress report stated that 
Turkey had achieved sufficient progress concerning the economic aspects of the 
acquis communautaire and was only adequately fulfilling the political part of the 
Copenhagen Criteria. Furthermore, the Commission is judgmental toward Turkey 
concerning minority issues, civil control over the military, freedom of expression 
issues and the Cyprus issue.168 In addition, we must take into serious 
consideration the fact that some countries, such as France and Germany, are not 
supportive of Turkey’s membership and they propose instead a “privileged 
partnership” between the EU and Turkey. The end of the year 2009 will be crucial 
 
168 Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2008 Progress Report (Brussels: 
October 5, 2008), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf (accessed August 29, 2009). 
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for the future of the accession negotiations between the EU and Turkey since the 
EU will have to announce its decision concerning the fate of the negotiations.  
C. TURKEY’S POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE START OF THE 
RAPPROCHEMENT PERIOD WITH GREECE (1999) 
In order to evaluate whether Turkey’s Europeanization process had 
positive effects on the level of democratic consolidation in the country, this 
section will conduct an examination of Turkey’s political situation up to 1999. This 
will make the comparison with the contemporary level of Turkey’s 
democratization easier. In addition, a brief comparison of the democratic levels of 
Greece and Turkey will be presented in order to understand why Greece decided 
to support Turkey’s efforts for accession in the EU. 
However, before we start with the evaluation of the level of democracy in 
Turkish politics, it is first necessary to give a brief description of the basic 
characteristic of a purely democratic regime. Robert A. Dahl proposed the 
following eight criteria that every state would have to fulfill in order to satisfy the 
requirements of a democracy: 
 The permanent existence of free and fair elections. 
 All adults have the right to vote. 
 All adults have the right to be elected. 
 The political leaders have the right to compete for support and 
votes. 
 Every citizen enjoys freedom of expression. 
 Every citizen enjoys freedom of association. 
 There are always available alternative sources of information that 
are not monopolized by the government. 
 Public institutions and officials depend on votes and other 
expressions of preference.169  
These eight main criteria for the characterization of a state as democratic also 
imply the development of additional social freedoms, such as the freedom of 
 
169 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy, Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1971), 3. 
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religion, the right to private life, etc. Although the above-mentioned criteria are 
not necessary for a political system to be democratic, they are always present in 
every contemporary Western-type democracy. 
In order to compare the level of democratization in Greece and Turkey at 
the start of their rapprochement procedure, this thesis will follow the paradigm of 
many other researchers, and thus it will use the data provided by the Freedom 
House surveys.170 Here it must be clarified that this thesis does not argue that 
Turkey is an authoritarian or undemocratic state. It is well known that the 
existence of free and fair elections accompanied by a multiparty political system 
has been a reality in Turkey since the early 1950s. However, as Grigoriadis 
argues, “a democratically consolidated state is not just a state where free 
democratic elections prevail but also the state where democratic values have 
been embraced by the majority of citizens after a long socialization process.”171 
With this in mind, let us proceed with the comparison in terms of democratic 
consolidation between Greece and Turkey for the year 1999. The thesis will use 
the data provided by the Freedom House surveys.172 Freedom House measures 
the wider state of freedom in a country or territory, reflecting both governmental 
and non-governmental constraints. More specifically, in the Freedom House 
surveys, each country’s status can be “free,” “partial free,” or “not free.” These 
statuses are associated with two sets of criteria similar to those that Robert Dahl 
suggested. First, the political rights criteria consist of elements relevant with the 
electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of the 
government. The second set of criteria is the civil liberties, such as freedom of 
expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, 
personal autonomy, and individual rights. 
 
170 For example Arend Lijphart in his book Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and 
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) is using the same 
database. 
171 Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization, 179. 
172 Data available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 (accessed October 
28,2009).    
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Each country and territory covered in the survey is assigned two numerical 
ratings, one for political rights and one for civil liberties, on a scale of 1 to 7; a 
rating of one indicates the highest degree of freedom and seven the least amount 
of freedom. Therefore, we can assume that the countries that are characterized 
by the Freedom House as “free” countries can also be regarded as democratic 
countries.  Table 9 indicates the ratings for Greece and Turkey during the year 
1999. 
 
Country Political Rights Civil Liberties Country’s Status 
Greece 1 3 Free 
Turkey 4 5 Partly Free 
Table 9.   Comparison of Greece-Turkey Rating for the Year 1999. 
As we can see from Table 10, Turkey has the status of a “partly free” 
country. The main reason for this status is the bad performance that Turkey had 
in the year 1999 in the sector of civil liberties, and also, in a smaller scale, in the 
sector of political rights. On the other hand, Greece seems to perform better in 
both sectors and especially in the field of political rights, where it achieved the 
highest degree of freedom. 
To understand the deeper reasons for these indications of little freedom 
concerning the political rights and civil liberties of the Turkish citizens, we will first 
look at the political history of Turkey after the end of the Second World War. The 
first Turkish politician to talk publicly about the need for an opposition party in the 
political life of Turkey was Ismet Inonu. In one of his speeches on November 1, 
1945, he emphasized the fact that the main problem of Turkish democracy was 
the absence of an opposition party.173 Almost two months later a new party 
emerged in Turkey, the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti). In the elections of 
1950, the Democrat Party, which had a more liberal agenda than its main 
opponent, the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), managed to 
                                            
173 Erik Jan Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998), 215.  
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win. When the Democrat Party came to power, its main purpose was to “broaden 
the scope of popular participation in Turkish politics and to show interest in the 
marginalized segments of Turkish society, especially the peasantry.”174 
Unfortunately, on April 27, 1960, a military coup erased all hope for the 
prevalence of a liberal regime in Turkey. Moreover, the 1960 coup was a good 
opportunity for the Kemalist bureaucracy to arrest many of the academics and 
officers that during the previous years had shown support toward the liberal 
regime of the Democrat Party. However, the Constitution that was announced on 
July 9, 1961, was more liberal than the previous one of 1924.175 More 
specifically, under the new Constitution “the activities of new parties, trade 
unions, and religious groups enjoyed wider freedoms, and individual human 
rights were better protected”176 On the other hand, the National Security Council 
(Milli Guvenlik Kurulu), as an official organ of the Turkish state, was incorporated 
into the 1961 Constitution. Initially, under the provisions of the 1960 Constitution, 
the National Security Council had the authority to offer information only to the 
elected government. However, the influence of the National Security Council’s 
recommendations “has gained strength over the decades by way of constitutional 
changes and amendments following military interventions.”177 The Turkish 
military handed over the power to the politicians on October 1961 after the 
execution of the former Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Fatin Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan, who were accused 
of violating the Constitution. Unfortunately, during the following years, the conflict 
between far left and far right groups did not stop, making political stability in 
Turkey very fragile.  
 
174 Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization, 29. 
175 For a succinct explanation of why the Turkish military decided to promote a new 
Constitution that included more liberal clauses, read, William Hale, Turkish Politics and the 
Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 137–42.  
176 Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization, 29. 
177 Sevgi Drorian, “Turkey: Security, State and Society in Troubled Times,” European 
Security 14, no.2 (June 2005), 264. 
 73
                                           
The next intervention of the military in the political life of Turkey took place 
on March 12, 1971. The Turkish military released a three-point memorandum 
urging the elected government to impose strict measures in order to maintain 
public order. In the so-called “Coup of Memorandum,” military officials warned 
the government that if it was unable to bring stability to the country, then the 
military was ready to take power once again. The new regime that emerged in 
the political life of Turkey “rested on an unstable balance of power between 
civilian politicians and the military; it was neither a normal elected government, 
nor an outright military dictatorship which could entirely ignore parliamentary 
opposition.”178 The main priority of the new regime was the restoration of law 
and order throughout the country. Therefore, it was important to repress any 
group viewed as leftist. Hence, the first step was to amend the Constitution of 
1961 in order to restrict the range of political freedoms that already existed. 
Indeed, the new amended Constitution of 1971 made possible “the curtailment of 
constitutionally protected civil liberties by law, while press freedom, university 
and media autonomy were curbed.”179 Alas, one more time, the civilian 
government failed to stop the clashes between militant leftist and rightist groups.  
These unfavorable political conditions led to a new and more vigorous 
military intervention on September 12, 1980. This time the National Security 
Council headed by General Kenan Evren declared coup d'état and imposed a 
martial law. Furthermore, it dissolved the Parliament and the government, 
suspended all of the political parties and banned the trade unions. The military 
leadership changed the Constitution one more time and ratified it by referendum 
on November 7, 1982. The new Constitution limited the political rights and civil 
liberties that were granted by the 1961 Constitution. More specifically, “the 
constitutional protection of fundamental human, political, and social rights was 
made conditional, as these could be annulled, suspended, or limited on alleged 
grounds of national interest, public order, national security, or danger to the 
 
178  William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (London: Routledge, 1994), 195.  
179 Grigoriadis, Trials of Europeanization, 30. 
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republican order.”180 Additionally, the new Constitution increased the power and 
influence of the National Security Council, and the civilian government was 
obligated to “implement the decisions of the National Security Council to the 
letter.”181 Thus after 1982, the National Security Council constituted “the more 
powerful and decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the 
council of ministers supplying the other leg.”182  
The end of the military junta in 1983 brought the Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi) to the government. The main priority of the new government 
was the modernization of the Turkish economy by adopting liberal economic 
principles. Another important issue was the escalating conflict with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK), which started in 1984 and reached its peak in 1994 when 
the PKK planned to declare its independence. Until 1997, there was no sign of 
efforts by the Turkish politicians moving toward the direction of political 
liberalization. On the contrary, on February 28, 1997 the military intervened 
again, this time by using “soft power” methods, in order to overthrow a coalition 
government led by pro-Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. In this case, 
the Turkish military leadership preferred not to directly intervene in the political 
life, for example, by declaring martial law or dissolving the Parliament, but 
instead started a propaganda campaign against the pro-Islamist coalition 
government using the media, intellectuals and academics. During the same year, 
the EU Summit in Luxembourg decided not to grant Turkey the status of a 
candidate country, and thus not to start the accession negotiations. 
Until 1999, Turkey did not represent the best example of a Western-type 
democracy. The Constitution of 1982 did not promote a liberal approach to 
politics and it significantly constrained freedoms, political rights and civil liberties 
that in Europe were considered basic ingredients of a consolidated democracy. 
In the next section of this chapter, this thesis will present the efforts that Turkey 
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made after 1999, when during the Helsinki Summit it officially became a 
candidate state, mainly through political reforms, in order to become a stronger 
democracy. 
D. THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEANIZATION PROCESS IN TURKEY’S 
POLITICAL REFORM  
In the following section, this thesis tries to evaluate whether Turkey’s EU 
candidacy since 1999, which has been accompanied by strong support from 
Greece, has motivated the Turkish political leadership to adopt political and legal 
reforms that can further consolidate democracy in Turkey. The thesis does not 
claim that the Europeanization process, along with the change of Greece’s 
stance toward Turkey’s efforts for accession, was the only motive behind the 
decision of the Turkish political elite to initiate a democratization process. Interest 
groups within the Turkish society, supportive toward the consolidation of liberal 
democratic values, were preexisting, but they did not have the power to pressure 
more intensively towards this direction. After 1999, those interest groups “had a 
higher bargaining power due to the pressures coming from the EU and the 
necessity of meeting the EU’s accession criteria.”183 The main argument of the 
thesis in this section is that the increased integration of liberal democratic norms 
in the political life of Turkey since 1999 is linked with the strengthening of the 
Turkish-EU relations, and with the new hope for membership that the 
rapprochement procedure between Greece and Turkey created the same year.  
In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, the European Commission, 






183  Meltem Muftuler Bac, “Turkey’s Political Reforms and the Impact of the European 
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the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a 
number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the 
military, remain to be effectively addressed. Despite a number of 
constitutional, legislative and administrative changes, the actual 
human right situation as it affects individuals in Turkey needs 
improvement.184    
Indeed, Turkey in March 2001 submitted an ambitious National Programme for 
the adoption of the acquis communautaire. However, due to the severe economic 
crisis that hit the country at the end of 2000 and the disagreement that existed 
between the political parties of the coalition government regarding the range of 
the political reforms that they had to implement in order to fulfill the accession 
criteria, Turkey spent almost two years without proceeding to any significant 
political reforms.185 There was no consensus about reforms that were touching 
issues that, according to the Turkish politicians, could affect in a negative way 
Turkey’s sovereignty and security. This was probably the main reason behind the 
EU’s decision during the Copenhagen Summit in December 2002, to review after 
two years the case of Turkey concerning the start of the accession negotiation. 
 This decision alerted the Turkish political leadership, which during the next 
three years proceeded to important reforms, which included nine Constitutional 
packages, a new Civil Code, and a new Penal Code.186 In order to evaluate if 
Turkey improved its democratic status, this thesis will examine what changes the 
Turkish government had applied concerning the freedom of association and the 
civil-military balance in Turkey’s political life. 
 
 
184 Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress 
Towards Accession, (Brussels: European Union 2001), 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf (accessed October 
22, 2009). 
185 The political parties that had formed the coalition government in Turkey were the 
Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party and the Nationalist Action Party. 
186 After the National elections of November 2002, the Justice and Development Party came 
in power and remains there until today. Prime Minister of Turkey since 2002 is Mr. Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan.   
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1. Freedom of Associations and the Evolution of Civil Society in 
Turkey  
According to Diamond, “civil society is the realm of organized social life 
that is voluntary, self-generating, self supporting, autonomous from the state, and 
bound by a legal order or a set of shared values.”187 The existence of an active 
civil society is a strong proof of the establishment of a prospering liberal 
democratic system. The support of civil associations shows the willingness of the 
state to promote active citizen participation in the democratic procedure, and thus 
to consolidate democratic norms and values throughout the country. 
One of the reasons that Turkey was considered to be a country with weak 
democratic values was the lack of a strong civil society. When Turkey became a 
candidate state, the EU started to pressure its political leadership toward the 
adoption of specific political reforms that would encourage the emergence of a 
vigorous civil society. Unfortunately, the civil society in Turkey during 1999 was 
non-existent. According to the 1982 Constitution (Article 33), “associations were 
prohibited from pursuing political aims, engaging in political activities, receiving 
support from or giving support to political parties, or taking joint action with labor 
unions or public professional organizations or foundations.”188 Furthermore, 
according to the Law of Associations that was voted by the military junta in 1983, 
“founding an association for the purpose of engaging in any activity on the 
grounds of or in the name of any region, race, social class, religion, or sect was 
banned.”189 In addition, the only language that the associations could use in their 
official contacts was Turkish. 
As it was expected, the European Commission criticized this situation in 
its annual progress report on Turkey. More specifically, in its 1999 report, the 
European Commission commented that, “the actual uphold of civil and political 
 
187 Larry Diamond, “Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation,” Journal of 
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rights enshrined in the Turkish Constitution and law remains problematic.”190 In 
the same report, the Commission also added that, “freedom of association is 
subject to certain limitations. Associations may not, for example, invite foreign 
associations to Turkey, issue public statements or organize any activities outside 
the premises without obtaining the prior permission of the authorities.”191 Finally, 
the European Commission, in its first report after the granting of the candidate 
country status to Turkey, reported, “major efforts are still required to guarantee 
freedom of association and assembly.”192  
After this intense criticism, the Turkish political leadership decided to 
proceed with the reforms shown in Table 10, with its main purpose to fulfill the 
EU’s accession criteria so that accession negotiations could begin. 
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Date Type of Reform Major Change 
October 2001 1st Constitutional Reform Freedom of association was guaranteed. 
March 2002 2nd Constitutional Reform 
Removal of restrictions 
concerning the relations with 
international associations. 
August 2002 3rd Constitutional Reform 
Permitted civil servants to 
establish associations. 
Permission granted for 
association activities 
concerning civil defense 
purposes. 
January 2003 4th Constitutional Reform 
Permission granted free use of 
any language in their non-
official contacts. Legal persons 
were allowed to join 
associations. 
July 2004 New Law on Associations 
Department of Associations 
was created within the Ministry 
of Interior. No restrictions on 
student associations. No 
limitations concerning race, 
ethnicity, religion, region for 
those who desire to establish or 
join an association. No need for 
permission to join foreign 
associations or open offices 
outside the country. 
Table 10.   Reforms Concerning the Freedom of Association 
After the implementation of the above-mentioned reforms, the European 
Commission, in its latest report concerning Turkey, reported that the number of 
associations and their members increased, and the conditions for establishing an 
association were further simplified. According to the same report, “the legal 
framework on associations is broadly in line with European standards. However, 
considerable progress needs to be made as regards its implementation, as 
associations still face disproportionate scrutiny of their activities, which in some 
cases has led to judicial proceedings.”193 Finally, the report referred to some 
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closure cases concerning associations related to educational issues, such as the 
opposition to the national security classes offered by military officers in schools.   
Hence, the conclusion is that during the period from 1999 to 2009 a 
quantitative and qualitative growth of the Turkish civil society can be observed. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there is room for further progress in this 
sector. In order for Turkey to come fully in line with the European legislation 
concerning issues such as freedom of association, the lack of trust between 
State institutions and civil organizations must be cease to exist.  
2. Civil—Military Relations in Turkey 
In all of the Western-type democracies, the sole responsibility for 
decisions on issues of national security is the democratically elected 
governments. The main role of the military leadership in every European country 
is only to obey and implement the decisions of the political leadership. 
In Turkey, the civil-military relations are different because the Turkish 
military leadership can influence in a large extent the formulation of the national 
security agenda. As Drorian argues, “although it is widely acknowledged that the 
Turkish military accepts the ultimate legitimacy of civilian rule in principle, it has 
nevertheless been consolidating its political and economic autonomy through 
legal and constitutional provisions, thereby enabling the expansion of its powers 
into the policy agenda.”194 The fact that the Turkish military has intervened four 
times since the end of World War II, in Turkey’s political life is a clear sign of the 
different perception that exists in Turkey about civil-military relations. According 
to the words of Kemal Ataturk, “whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take 
a step up, it has always looked to the army as the leader of movements to 
achieve lofty national ideas. The Turkish nation…considers its army the guardian 
of its ideals.”195  
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 Therefore, in this section, this thesis examines how the Europeanization 
efforts of Turkey after 1999 affected the influence that the Turkish military has in 
matters relating to political issues. As this thesis has already described, with the 
ratification of 1982 Constitution, the National Security Council became “the more 
powerful and decisive leg of a dual system of executive decision making, the 
council of ministers supplying the other leg.”196 Moreover, the European 
Commission, in its progress report for Turkey clearly states,  
there has been no changes in the role played by the National 
Security Council in Turkish political life. Its conclusions, statements 
and recommendations continue to strongly influence the political 
process. In addition, it appears that at present the views of the 
National Security Council in practice seriously limit the role played 
by the government. Moreover, there seems to be too little 
accountability to the Parliament with regard to defense and security 
matters.197   
Starting in 2001, the Turkish political leadership implemented political 
reforms with the main purpose to limit the political influence of the military 
leadership. More specifically, with the amendment of Article 118 of the 
Constitution, the number of civilian members in the composition of the National 
Security Council increased from five to nine, while the number of the military 
members remained at five. Additionally, the new Article clearly stated that the 
role of the National Security Council was only to provide recommendations to the 
elected government. 
In July 2003, a new amendment to the Law on the National Security 
Council “abolished the extended executive and supervisory powers of the 
Council’s Secretary General.”198 In addition, the same amendment removed the 
authority that the National Security Council had for unlimited access to any 
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civilian agency. Finally, the new law stated, “the post of Secretary General would 
no longer be reserved exclusively for a military officer.”199 Nevertheless, the 
most important reform concerning the National Security Council was 
implemented in 2004. Initially, the powers of the Council’s Secretariat General 
were limited. In particular, the National Security Council’s ability to autonomously 
investigate national security issues and independently manage the funds 
allocated to it came under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, 
many services within the National Security Council were closed, and a significant 
staff reduction was conducted. Finally, for the first time in the history of the 
National Security Council, a civilian took the position of the Secretary General.200 
As the European Commission commented, reforms over the last years 
concerning the functioning of the National Security Council have further shifted 
the balance of civil-military relations toward the civilians and encouraged p
 in this area”201   
Unfortunately, in the years that followed, reforms concerning the civil-
military balance slowed down. This is evident from all the annual reports of the 
European Commission fro
reports are the following: 
 The armed forces have continued to exercise undue political 
influence via formal and informal mechanisms. Senior members 
of the armed forces have expressed on a large number of 
occasions their views on domestic and foreign policy issues 
going beyond their remit, including on Cyprus, ethnicity, the 
Southeas
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 No change has been made to the Turkish Armed Forces 
Internal Service Law or to the Law on the National Security 
Council. These define the roles and duties of the Turkish military 
and grant the military wide room for maneuver by providing a 
broad definition of national security. 
 The 1997 EMASYA secret protocol on security, public order and 
assistance units remains in force unchanged. The protocol 
allows military operations to be carried out for internal security 
reasons under certain conditions without a request from the 
civilian authorities. 
 No progress has been made on strengthening legislative 
oversight of the military budget and expenditure. Likewise, the 
Defense Industry Support Fund (SSDF), from which most 
procurement projects are financed, is still an extra-budgetary 
fund excluded from parliamentary scrutiny. Parliament has no 
mandate to develop security and defense policies.202 
Overall, the EU’s latest evaluation concerning civilian oversight of the military in 
Turkey stated specifically, “some progress has been made, in particular on 
limiting the jurisdiction of military courts. However, senior members of the armed 
forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit, and full 
parliamentary oversight of defense expenditure needs to be ensured. The 
alleged involvement of military personnel in anti-government activities, disclosed 
by the investigation on Ergenekon, raises serious concerns.”203 
The civil-military relations in Turkey are a very complicated issue. 
Especially after the rise to power of Turkey’s pro-Islamic Justice and 
Development Party, and despite all the legislative reforms that Prime Minister 
Erdogan and his government tried to implement, it seems as if the military 
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leadership still enjoys its independency and the lack of direct control by the State. 
As Bac argues, “the military’s omnipotent power does not only come from the 
institutions, but from the fact that the Turkish military is still the most trusted 
institution in Turkey, and that declarations by military officials are still regarded as 
very important.”204 
3. Overall Evaluation of Turkey’s Democratic Reforms 
Turkey’s efforts for the adoption of rules and norms of liberal democracy 
did not stop at the strengthening of civil society or at the improvement of civil-
military relations. The Turkish political leadership took further actions in order to 
bring the country closer to the Western democratic prototype. One of the most 
important reforms was the adoption of a new Civil Code in November 2001. 
According to the new code, “In case of divorce, a woman’s right to property 
accumulated during marriage would be recognized.”205 Overall, the new Civil 
Code was a major advance in terms of gender equality. Moreover, in August 
2002, after an extensive constitutional reform, the Turkish political leadership 
decided to abolish the death penalty during peacetime, improved the previous 
“authoritarian” Anti-Terror law, and allowed free broadcasting of TV and Radio 
programs in languages other than Turkish. In addition, this constitutional reform 
package “opened the road for the retrial of all the cases that the European Court 
of Human Rights found to be in violation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights,”206 and recognized the Kurdish minority rights by increasing their 
freedom of expression and granting them additional cultura
After the national elections of November 2002, the political scenery in 
Turkey changed radically. Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and 
Development Party won the elections and formed a majority government. The 
new government started its democratization attempts by ordering the retrial of all 
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the State Security Courts’ cases. The most important case was that of the four 
Democracy Party Parliament Members who had been in jail since 1994, accused 
of supporting Kurdish separatism and terrorist acts in Turkey. The four politicians 
were released in June 2004 after the retrial of their case. This was a first sign of 
Turkey’s decisiveness to implement reforms that would help toward the adoption 
of the EU accession criteria. Generally, Prime Minister Erdogan’s government 
proceeds in many important reforms, such as the 2003 revision of the Penal 
Code that predicted severe punishment for torture and ill treatment cases. 
Another important reform was the adoption of Protocols 6 and 13 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights that lead respectively to the conversion 
of all death sentences to life imprisonment and to the abolishment of the death 
penalty even in wartime. Furthermore, the constitutional amendments of May 
2004 led to the final abolishment of the State Security Courts, to the 
establishment of freedom of press, and above all, to the ratification of Article 90 
of the constitution that grants priority to the international treaties ratified by the 
Turkish Parliament over the Constitutional Court. More specifically, Article 90 
clearly states that, “international agreements duly put into effect carry the force of 
law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court can be made with regard to these 
agreements, on the ground that they are unconstitutional.”207  
In the period after 2005 and despite the initiation of the accession 
negotiations between the EU and Turkey, the efforts of Turkey’s political 
leadership toward EU accession declined. The main reason for this decreasing 
pace of the reform process was the domestic political instability produced by the 
conflict between Turkey’s secularist establishment and the Islamist-rooted 
government of the Justice and Development Party. However, in November 2009, 
Prime Minister Erdogan’s government announced its determination to grant 
additional rights to the Kurdish minority, such as allowing major Kurdish town 
names to be restored and allowing politicians to campaign to Kurds in their native 
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language.208 Moreover, the Turkish Minister of Interior Affairs Besir Atalay 
announced the establishment of an independent commission, whose main 
purpose will be to investigate human rights violations. More specifically, Atalay’s 
speech on the Turkish Parliament emphasized that, “an independent anti-
discrimination commission will be established and a bill related to this will be sent 
to parliament.”209 The purpose of these reforms is to give back to Turkey the lost 
momentum and thus boost Turkey’s hopes of EU membership.210   
The main conclusion of this section is that Turkey has made progress in 
the period after 1999 in the field of democratization and implementation of the 
political aspects of the Copenhagen criteria. This is also evident from the 
Freedom House rating of Turkey for the year 2009. From the comparison in 
Table 11 between the 1999 and 2009 ratings yields a significant improvement in 
the sector of civil liberties and a sufficient improvement in the sector of political 
rights. Despite the fact that Turkey still has the status of a “partly free” state, the 
improvement of its democratic characteristics is evident. We can also see from 
Table 11 the comparison between Turkey and Greece for the year 2009. Greece 
remains a “Free” country according to Freedom House rating and it has improved 
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  Country Year Political Rights Civil Liberties Country’s Status 
Turkey 1999 4 5 Partly Free 
Turkey  2009 3 3 Partly Free 
Greece 1999 1 3 Free 
Greece  2009 1 2 Free 
Table 11.   Comparison of Greece-Turkey Rating for the Years 1999–2009211 
Thus, we can conclude that the rapprochement procedure had positive 
results in the field of democratization since both countries improved their 
democratic indexes. The important finding is that Turkey, which was the less 
democratic country of the dyad, and thus according to Russett and Oneal, the 
primary responsible for determining the likelihood of conflict, made important 
steps toward the adoption of liberal democratic norms and rules. As stated earlier 
in this section, “the influence of democratization is usually to lower the risk of 
disputes,”212 therefore the window of opportunity for a resolution of the Greco-
Turkish disputes, namely the Cyprus issue and the delimitation of the Aegean 
Sea continental shelf, remains open. Of course, Turkey’s road to democratization 
and Europeanization is still long. As Grigoriadis noted, “the liberalization of 
Turkish political culture is far from complete but has achieved significant 
steps.”213 Despite the important domestic political changes, an acceleration of 
the reform process is required in order for Turkey to receive, in December 2009, 
a positive answer from the EU concerning the fate of its accession negotiations.  
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VI. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE THIRD PILLAR OF 
THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY 
The third pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory is the common 
participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGO). Russett and Oneal, in 
their book Triangulating Peace, asked whether joint membership in IGOs also 
reduces the incidence of militarized disputes. Their hypothesis to be tested was 
the following, “the greater the numbers of IGOs in which both states of a dyad 
are members, the more forums there are for peaceful conflict resolution and the 
greater the prospects for peace.”214 Their findings suggest that, “IGOs make an 
additional contribution to reducing the frequency of disputes above and beyond 
those of democracy and trade.”215 Many scholars of international relations 
support the same argument.216 More specifically, Boehmer emphasizes, “global 
politics is increasingly organized around institutions that foster cooperation by 
providing information and organizational structure, promoting norms and 
common belief systems, reducing transaction costs…..and leading to a decline in 
militarized violence.”217  
Since the purpose of this thesis is not to analyze the debate between 
functionalist, constructivists and institutionalists on the one side and realists on 
the opposite side, the thesis will accept the findings of the supporters of the 
Democratic Peace Theory. Thus, the full integration of Turkey in the EU is 
considered a positive step toward the establishment of peaceful relations 
between the two countries. Therefore, in this section the thesis will try to give an 
answer to the following set of questions: 
 
214 Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace, 170. 
215 Ibid., 172. 
216 Ernst Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964); Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” 
International Security 20, no.1 (1995); Keohane and Nye 1989. 
217 Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke, and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental 
Organizations Promote Peace?” World Politics 57, (October 2004), 3. 
 90
                                           
  Why has the common participation of Greece and Turkey in 
NATO failed to produce the virtuous circles that can lead to a 
resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes? 
  Is the EU more capable of resolving these issues? Why does 
Greece prefer to transfer its bilateral problems with Turkey to 
the EU field? Does the EU offer more opportunities for peaceful 
resolution of the Greco-Turkish disputes than NATO?  
1. The Greco-Turkish Relations in the Context of NATO 
Greece and Turkey have common participation in many IGOs, such as the 
United Nations (UN), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the Union 
for the Mediterranean, and NATO. Unfortunately, and in contradiction with the 
findings of Russett and Oneal, the cooperation through these IGOs has not 
translated into a constructive force that would help the two neighboring countries 
bridge their differences. This section will examine why the common participation 
of the two countries in NATO failed to resolve the Greco-Turkish disputes.218  
As already mentioned in Chapter II, Greece perceives Turkey’s intention 
to change the status-quo in the Aegean Sea as a major threat to its security. 
From the first years of its membership in NATO, Greece considered the Alliance 
as a very effective way of balancing Turkey.219 Greek politicians realized a few 
years after the end of the Greek Civil War that the main threat for Greece’s 
security was not the Warsaw Pact but Turkey. Thus their main efforts were to 
encourage NATO to “become more actively engaged in its defense and to turn it 
into a security providing organization.”220 This is a natural reaction for a small 
state like Greece. As Krebs argues, “small states, whether primarily revisionist or 
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status quo, join alliances because they cannot attain their central values alone, 
and their success in achieving their aims depends less on their own capabilities 
than on the strength and credibility of their large patrons.”221 In the case of 
Greece, this statement is not accurate, since Greece also made efforts to 
balance internally the Turkish threat by having one of the highest defense 
budgets of the members of the alliance. Greece’s policy vis-à-vis Turkey was 
based on a combination of internal (strong, well-equipped Armed Forces) and 
external (participation in IGOs, namely NATO) balancing.    
Greece’s strategic thinking changed after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 
1974. This was the turning point in NATO-Greek relations. NATO’s inability to 
interfere in the Cyprus crisis bothered the new democratic leadership of Greece. 
Even if NATO was unable to play a substantial role, “paralyzed as it was at the 
prospect of a war between two of its members,”222 the desire to avoid the 
internationalization of the crisis, supported by the United States and England, 
was provocative for Greece.223 More specifically, Greece after its military defeat 
and diplomatic humiliation understood that it had to reconsider its position in the 
alliance. Despite the neutral stance of NATO in the Cyprus crisis, in the following 
years Greece made unsuccessful efforts in order to get an official guarantee from 
NATO for their borders with Turkey. As Kalaitzaki noted, “Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou went further by asking NATO to guarantee Greece’s Eastern 
borders. The Greek demand for border guarantees was repeated for some years 
but then shelved, as neither Washington nor NATO (let alone Turkey) was 
inclined to accept this kind of an arrangement.”224   
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 Hence, the “expectation-reality gap” made its appearance and constituted 
one of the main reasons that led Greece to transfer its bilateral problems with 
Turkey to the EU field. According to Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, the term 
“expectation-reality gap”, refers to the gap “between Greece’s efforts to turn 
existing Euro-Atlantic institutions into security providers and cases indicating the 
inability of those security institutions to meet Greece’s expectations.”225 
Therefore, Greece’s political leaders perceived NATO’s indifference concerning 
the problems that Greece had with Turkey, as a sign that the alliance considered 
Turkey to be a more important ally than Greece. The impression that within 
NATO the political balance of power favored Turkey forced Greece to search for 
alternative ways of balancing this deficit. 
Furthermore, the common participation of Greece and Turkey in NATO did 
not manage to create the virtuous circles that could lead to a peaceful resolution 
of their bilateral problems because the alliance did not have an effective 
organizational procedure for resolution of conflicts between the member states. 
As retired British diplomat Rodric Braithwaite stated, “Greece and Turkey have 
more than once been on the verge of war. They were prevented from going over 
not by their common membership of NATO, but by the U.S pressure unilaterally 
applied.”226 For example, in the so-called “Aegean dispute,” that has been the 
main problem between the two countries since 1974, NATO “followed a hands-off 
policy intended to project the alliance impartiality and has encouraged both 
nations to settle their disputes bilaterally. It attempted neither to take a more 
active role as a mediator nor to take public positions on the bilateral dispute.”227 
Until today, NATO did not succeed in helping toward a common acceptable 
solution of the Greco-Turkish disputes. However, according to Krebs, “despite 
the continual armed skirmishes and the virtually continuous war of words, the 
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dispute never did erupt into full-fledged war, and for that NATO deserves some 
credit.”228 The previous statement is true, but it was not enough to alter Greece’s 
political leadership decision to seek alternative ways of resolving these 
problematic issues. 
At this point, it is useful to examine how the nature and the character of 
NATO, as one of the leading intergovernmental organizations, influence Greece’s 
decision to transfer the center of gravity concerning the Greco-Turkish disputes, 
from NATO to the EU. When Greece and Turkey joined NATO, they had only one 
common enemy, the Warsaw Pact. The factor that enhanced the resurrection of 
old conflicts that had been put aside by both countries was the security that the 
alliance provided against the common threat, regardless the contribution of each 
state to the alliance’s purposes. As Krebs argues, “with the deterrence of the 
primary security threat no longer falling on their shoulders, small-state decision 
makers turn inward and focus more intently on secondary concerns, particularly 
their long-standing conflicts with regional rivals.”229 Therefore, the common 
membership of Greece and Turkey in NATO, instead of creating an environment 
of cooperation, led to a shift in the foreign policy focus of both countries. From 
the Greek perspective, Turkey, having secured the threat from the Warsaw Pact, 
revealed its revisionist intentions concerning its borders with Greece. On the 
other hand, Greece stopped seeing the Warsaw Pact as the primary threat to its 
security and officially announced that the main security concern is the “threat 
from the East.”230  
Moreover, the supplying of both countries with weapons by the alliance in 
order to build up their defenses, and thus contribute to the collective security of 
NATO, created additional problems in their relations. Unfortunately, Turkey had 
proved that it has no constraints in using military equipment provided by the 
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alliance for collective purposes against a European country (Cyprus in this case). 
Most of the Greek policymakers perceived the fact that “a NATO member, using 
NATO weapons, had taken 35,000 troops out of the NATO structure in order to 
occupy another democratic European country,”231 as a sign of NATO’s ineptness 
or apathy to obstruct a military conflict between two of its members. Turkey’s 
punishment for the invasion and occupation of 37 percent of Cyprus’ territory was 
the imposition by the American Congress of an arms embargo that lasted from 
February 5, 1975, until September 13, 1978.232 Therefore, Greece has no 
guarantee that Turkey will not use weapons intended for use against enemies of 
the alliance against an ally, especially now that NATO seems confused about 
who the enemy is and what its mission is.  
Another characteristic of all intergovernmental organizations that NATO 
could take advantage of in order to contribute to the solution of the Greco-Turkish 
disputes was that of the “issue linkage.” According to neoliberalism 
institutionalism, intergovernmental organizations can promote cooperation “by 
linking issue areas, creating greater opportunities for side payments and 
compromise.”233 In Keohane words, “clustering of issues under a regime 
facilitates side payments among these issues: more potential quids are available 
for the quo.”234 The Greek perspective on this issue is that Turkey took 
advantage of the preferential treatment it received from the major forces in the 
alliance, namely the United States, and manipulated the issue-linking procedures 
of NATO in order to expand the conflict with Greece in issues that can produce 
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future gains. The Greek side maintains that it is not accidental that until 1974, the 
only problem between Greece and Turkey was Cyprus, and after the invasion of 
Cyprus, Turkey started to challenge Greece in numerous issues. More 
specifically, Turkey violated Greek airspace in the Aegean on a daily basis. 
Challenged the Aegean status quo by supporting the theory of “grey zones,” 
declared a casus belli against Greece in the case of an extension of its territorial 
waters from six to twelve miles, and refused to submit the dispute over the 
delimitation of the Aegean Sea continental shelf to the International Court of 
Justice. The neutral stance of NATO in all the above-mentioned issues allowed 
Turkey to harbor revisionist aspirations and disappointed or frustrated Greece. 
In the post Cold War era, the international landscape changed 
dramatically. The international system transformed from a bipolar to a unipolar 
system. According to Walt, “a unipolar system is one in which a single state 
controls a disproportionate share of the politically relevant resources of the 
system.”235 In this new international environment, Greece had to rethink its 
strategy toward Turkey and NATO. The unipolar international system played an 
important role in this decision. As Walt argues, “alliances depend in part on 
credibility, and unipolarity is likely to have somewhat contradictory effects on the 
role that credibility plays in contemporary alliances. Thus, because the unipole 
has less need for allies, its partners have more reason to doubt any pledges it 
does make.”236 Therefore, Greece having the bitter experience of the Cold War 
era, and regarding the U.S. and NATO support concerning its bilateral disputes 
with Turkey, had one more reason to transfer all the problematic issues to the EU 
field.  
Furthermore, due to the unipolar nature of the international system, Walt 
supports that, “medium and small powers will have less influence and leverage 
than they enjoyed under bipolarity…this will encourage them to rely on 
 
235 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics 61, no.1 (January 2009), 
91. 
236 Ibid., 97. 
 96
                                           
alternative strategies of alliance maintenance.”237 Again, Greece had realized 
early on that Turkey, mainly due to its geographical position, population and 
religion, was a more valuable ally for NATO. Any advantage that Greece had vis-
à-vis Turkey concerning their common participation in NATO was minimized. 
Hence, if it was difficult to influence the major power of the alliance during the 
Cold War era, in the contemporary unipolar world the chance of that happening 
was null.  Thus, shifting the prime focus of its foreign policy toward the EU was 
an easy and logical decision for Greece’s policymakers. 
Greece believes that the only threat for its security is Turkey. In order to 
deal with this threat more effectively, all the Greek governments, after the end of 
World War II, were trying to engage NATO in its balancing policy toward Turkey. 
Unfortunately for Greece, “numerous examples can be advanced to illustrate the 
expectations-reality gap that Greek governments have experienced in their 
efforts to turn NATO into security-providing bulwark.”238 Thus, Greece decided to 
alter its stance by seeking solutions to its long-lasting problems with Turkey in 
the EU field. The next section of this chapter will examine why Greece shifted the 
prime focus of its foreign policy to the EU level and whether the EU is more 
capable than NATO of contributing to a peaceful resolution of the Greco-Turkish 
disputes. 
2. The Greco-Turkish Relations in the European Union’s Context 
During the years before the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Greece’s stance 
toward Turkey’s aspiration for accession in the EU was not supportive. Greece 
kept an obstructive stance against Turkey’s candidacy and at the same time did 
its best to promote the candidacy of Cyprus. At the end of 1998, a shift of the 
Greek foreign policy concerning its bilateral relation with Turkey took place during 
the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki. In this meeting, Greece agreed 
in granting Turkey the status of a candidate country for the EU.  
 
237 Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar,” 98. 
238 Tsakonas and Tournikiotis, “Greece’s Elusive Quest,” 311. 
 97
                                           
The rationale behind Greece’s change of stance is simple. Greek 
policymakers approached Turkey’s quest for EU membership positively but 
always thinking in terms of security, mainly linked with the Aegean and Cyprus 
issues. Greece understood, especially after the “Imia crisis” of 1996, that the 
maintenance of a hostile atmosphere, or even worse, the initiation of a military 
conflict, would harm Greece’s national interests. The “Imia crisis” also made clear 
to Greece that it can no longer rely on NATO and the United States for protection 
against the perceived “revisionist policy” of Turkey. In addition, it became evident 
that the internal balancing efforts that Greece made during the previous decades, 
mainly through enormous spending in defense equipment, were not enough to 
deter Turkey. Therefore, Greece, with the challenge of membership in the 
European Monetary Union ahead of it, would not be able to continue spending 
annually almost 4.5 percent of its GDP for defense purposes.239 Hence, the only 
way to improve its deterrence posture toward Turkey was the adoption of an 
alternative and more effective external balancing doctrine.   
Greece decided to transfer its problematic relations with Turkey to the EU 
because, as Ifantis argues, “The EU was the best available forum for setting 
priorities and placing demands in accordance with European principles, on those 
countries wishing to become members.”240 Furthermore, Greece, by supporting 
Turkey’s EU vocation during the Helsinki Summit, attempted to take advantage of 
its “monopoly in the EU arena to garner political support in its bilateral dispute, 
and its capacity to block Turkish entry into the Community, has provided it with a 
powerful lever with which to wring concession from Turkey.”241 It was evident 
that for Greece, the Helsinki Summit “has been the departure point for engaging 
 
239 In order for Greece to become a member of the European Monetary Union, the 
implementation of a very strict economic program, imposed by the EU, had to be fulfilled. 
240 Kostas Ifantis, “Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations: A View from 
Greece,” in Conditionality, Impact and Prejudice in EU-Turkey Relations, ed. Nathalie Tocci 
(Rome: Instituto Affari Internazionali, 2007), 61. 
241 Krebs, “Perverse Institutionalism,” 366. 
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Turkey in a context in which Greece has enjoyed a comparative advantage, thus 
making the EU a major determinant in Greek-Turkish relations.”242  
Greece adopted this new strategy for one more reason that is relevant 
with the nature of the EU as an intergovernmental organization. More specifically, 
from the birth of the EU, its members managed to remove one of the main 
obstacles to cooperation between them, namely “the fear that the greater 
advantage of one would be translated into military force to be used against the 
other.”243 Therefore, the main difference between NATO and the EU in terms of 
principles was that the members of NATO “are compelled to ask not ‘Will both of 
us gain?’ but ‘Who will gain more?’”244 While the EU member state clearly, that 
“by cooperation all can gain something even if all do not gain equally.”245 This 
different approach of international cooperation that the EU has as its main policy 
is what made Greece believe that “its own economic and strategic interests 
would not be properly served if Turkey was left isolated and pushed further away 
from the European sphere of influence. There was also a realization by the 
Greek political and business elites that as the two societies prospered, mutual 
economic gains in terms of expansion of trade, investment and tourism would be 
of mutual benefit.”246 Thus, Greece expected that by “increasing social, political 
and economic interaction with Turkey, with the latter’s adaption to European 
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246 Ziya Onis, “Luxemburg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent 
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political system and foreign policy, rendering the country more democratic and 
less ‘revisionist’. This would allow for a gradual convergence of bilateral security 
perceptions and interests.”247  
Finally, Greece preferred to transfer its bilateral disputes with Turkey to 
the EU level because the EU adopted Greece’s view that the accession of 
Turkey to the Union is directly linked with the resolution of the “Aegean dispute” 
and the solution of the Cyprus issue.248 The EU proved its determination to 
adopt Greece’s security concerns vis-à-vis Turkey in the Helsinki Summit. More 
specifically, the EU clearly stated in the Presidency Conclusion of the Summit 
that Turkish claims concerning the ‘gray zones’ in the Aegean and the dispute 
over the delimitation of the continental shelf had to be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice, if all other efforts failed. In addition, the accession 
of Cyprus to the EU would not be conditional on the resolution of the Cyprus 
problem.249   
Greece’s support to Turkey’s EU vocation was not without conditions. 
Greece desires Turkey’s transformation to a purely liberal democracy since this 
event will create virtuous circles in their bilateral relation and will eventually lead 
to a peaceful coexistence and cooperation. “A stable, democratic and prosperous 
Turkey would be a reliable neighbor and partner to Greece.”250 However as a 
prominent Turkish scholar observed, “After Helsinki the ball is firmly in Turkey’s 
court in the sense that it has to undertake the radical reforms in the domestic 
sphere both in the arenas of democratization and economic policy reforms in 
 
247 Ifantis, “Conditionality, Impact,” 86–87. 
248 According to the Negotiation Framework Protocol for Turkey that signed in October 3, 
2005, Turkey, in addition to the Copenhagen criteria, had to fulfill three additional conditions 
relevant to the resolution of the Cyprus issue and to the problematic Greek-Turkish relations. For 
more details, see page 61 of this thesis.  
      249 Panayotis Tsakonas and Thanos Dokos, “Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-
First Century: A view from Athens,” in The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy, ed. Lenore G. Martin 
and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004), 101–126. 
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order to qualify for full membership. Stated somewhat differently, the door is 
open, provided the necessary conditions are satisfied.”251   
3. Progress on the Greek-Turkish “High Politics” Issues 
In this section, the thesis will evaluate whether Turkey reciprocates 
Greece’s shift of policy by adopting a more cooperative stance on the issues that 
are poisoning the Greek-Turkish relations.  
Starting with the Cyprus issue, Turkey has not changed its stance since 
1999. Thus, until now, Turkey has not officially recognized the Republic of 
Cyprus as an independent state, and it maintains almost 25,000 fully equipped 
soldiers in the occupied Northern part of the island. Furthermore, despite the fact 
that Cyprus became a member of the EU in 2004, Turkey still refuses to 
implement the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, signed on July 
29, 2005, and hence, it does not open its ports and airports to the Cyprus 
commercial fleet, obstructing the free circulation of goods and people. Turkey 
also continues to veto Cyprus’ application for participation in intergovernmental 
organizations that it is already a member of, such as Partnership for Peace and 
NATO. It is evident that “without progress based on the reality of Cyprus being a 
sovereign member of the UN and a full member of the EU, the current 
rapprochement will be hard to sustain over time.”252 
Furthermore, Turkey continues to violate daily the Greek national 
airspace. The following figure presents the numbers of violations as well as the 
number of Turkish Air Force’s fighter jets that have illegally entered the Greek 
national airspace annually since 1999.  
 
251 Onis, “Luxemburg, Helsinki,” 476. 
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Figure 4.   Violation of Greek National Airspace by the Turkish Air Force 
      














Figure 5.   Dogfights between Greek and Turkish Fighter Jets253  
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253 From: Unclassified data of the Hellenic Minister of Defense. Author’s personal archive.   
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Figure 5 presents the number of dogfights between Greek and Turkish 
fighter jets. Both figures show that after 1999, Turkey, instead of reducing the 
number of violations, increased its illegal activity in the Aegean due to the shift of 
Greece’s foreign policy, especially after 2001. More intense activity of the Turkish 
Air Force is observed during the years 2002, 2003 and 2005. However, even the 
numbers for the year 2008 is almost 10 percent higher in the number of 
violations, 30 percent higher in the number of dogfights and almost 230 percent 
higher in the number of fighter jets that performed violations, compared to the 
data of 1999. This data shows that Turkey not only upgraded its aggressive 
stance in the Aegean quantitative, but also in the qualitative since during the last 
year larger groups of fighter jets proceeded to violate Greece’s national airspace. 
These actions must be avoided because, as the former US Ambassador to 
Greece stated, “I am convinced that Greece and Turkey want to avoid conflict, 
but when you have mock dogfights, you’re going to run a little bit of risk.”254 
Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyanni expressed the disappointment of the 
Greek government for the continuous tension in the Aegean during one of the 
last meetings of the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council. More 
specifically, Mrs. Bakoyanni stated, “Turkey’s accession negotiations were based 
on principles and a clear negotiating framework that clearly provide for an 
obligation to respect good neighborly relations and peaceful resolution of 
differences.” She also added, “over the past few weeks, Turkey had been 
following a policy of provocation with successive overflights by Turkish military 
aircrafts over Greek territory and an attempt to establish claims to parts of 
Greece’s continental shelf. This policy is unacceptable.”255  
 
 
254  Statement of Nicholas Burns. U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Athens News, October 31, 
2009 available at http://www.hri.org/news/greek/apeen/1998/98-10-31.apeen.html (accessed 
August 25, 2009). 
255 Clive Levier - Sawyes, “Air Space?” The Sofia Echo, July 31, 2009, 
http://sofiaecho.com/2009/07/31/763573-air-space (accessed September 22, 2009). 
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Overall, Greece’s belief is that Turkey is not corresponding positively to its 
diplomatic openings. Despite the fact that Greece is a sincere supporter of 
Turkey’s EU bid, Greek policymakers believe that the Turkish side has not made 
any efforts during the last ten years that can contribute to the resolution of the 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The European Council Helsinki Summit marked the initiation of the 
rapprochement procedure between Turkey and Greece, a dyad that for many 
decades was a source of instability in the Eastern part of Europe. After 1999, 
Greece abandoned the “Cold War rhetoric” in its relation with Turkey and shifted 
its foreign policy toward a more moderate stance by raising its veto regarding 
Turkey’s accession in the EU. Greece’s new foreign policy has many common 
elements with the Democratic Peace Theory of international relations. Hence, 
this thesis asks the following question: do the Greco-Turkish peaceful relations 
from 1999 until today fits the Democratic Peace Theory? 
In Chapter IV, an examination of macroeconomic indexes and trade 
statistics of both countries revealed that the first pillar of the Democratic Peace 
Theory, namely economic interdependence, is very weak. More specifically the 
analysis of the data proved that both countries did not reach the expected 
threshold in their bilateral economic activities, beyond which the created 
economic interdependence would facilitate the establishment of the virtuous 
circles necessary for the peaceful resolution of their bilateral problematic issues. 
The other two pillars of the theory, democratic consolidation and common 
participation in international organization, were examined in Chapter V and VI 
respectively. In the sector of democracy, Turkey has made important steps 
during the last ten years. However, improvement must be made in many sections 
of Turkey’s political rights, such as minority rights, gender equality, quality of civil 
society, freedom of expression, civil-military relation, etc. Turkey’s road to 
democratization and Europeanization is still long. Despite the important domestic 
political changes, an acceleration of the reform process is required in order for 
Turkey to receive, in December 2009, a positive answer from the EU concerning 




that the democratic pillar of the Democratic Peace Theory is the element that 
plays a more significant role in the promotion of peace and stability between the 
two countries. 
The common participation of Greece and Turkey in numerous 
intergovernmental organizations did not help toward a common acceptable 
solution of their bilateral disputes, namely the delimitation of the Aegean Sea 
continental shelf and the Cyprus issue. Unfortunately, Turkey continues until 
today to violate on a daily basis Greece’s national airspace and territorial waters; 
it has not revoked the 1995 casus belli threat, and it continues to question the 
legal status of a large number of Aegean Sea’s islands and islets by supporting 
its “grey-zones” theory. Moreover, despite the fact that Cyprus has been a 
member of the EU since May 1, 2004, Turkey insists on keeping its port and 
airport facilities closed to Cyprus’ commercial fleet. Finally, Turkey refuses to 
recognize the Republic of Cyprus as an independent state. 
The evidence leads to the conclusion that the Greco-Turkish 
rapprochement procedure lacks reciprocity. Turkey, instead of addressing the 
high politics issues that constitute the heart of the problem, is just articulating 
cooperative rhetoric and employing symbolic gestures concerning low politics 
issues. In contrast, Greece continues to support the European aspirations of 
Turkey, despite the fact that it had many opportunities during the last ten years to 
veto Turkey’s negotiations with the EU. However, the maintenance of Greece’s 
stance has inherent limits if not accompanied by reciprocal gestures. It may 
prove difficult for future Greek governments to sustain domestic support for 
Turkey in the long run. It is also very useful to examine what percentage the 
Greek public opinion supports Turkey’s efforts for accession in the EU. According 
to the data available only for the period from 2000 to 2006, Greek public opinion 
does not support Turkey’s EU bid. More specifically, the higher percentage of 
support was observed during 2000, right after the catastrophic earthquakes that 
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hit both countries, when it reached 40 percent. For the rest of the years, the 
public support for Turkey’s efforts remained low, at around 20 percent.256   
In the period from 1999 until today, Greece and Turkey avoid a major 
crisis that could bring them close to a military conflict.257 Thus, a conclusion of 
this thesis could be that the major finding of the Democratic Peace Theory, 
namely that democracies do not fight each other, is valid in the case of the 
Greco-Turkish dyad. However, as Jane Addams believed, “peace is not merely 
an absence of war.”258 This is an unpleasant reality, especially in the case of 
Greece and Turkey, because it is difficult to claim that a peaceful relationship 
exists when the causes of all the previous crises are still present and one of the 
two states seems unwilling to contribute to a prosperous coexistence.  
In sum, the evidence presented in this thesis prove that the 
rapprochement procedure that Greece initiated in 1999 has not yet produced the 
desirable virtuous circles, which the Democratic Peace Theory predicts, in the 
Greco-Turkish relations. On the contrary, the security concerns of Greece remain 
unaltered despite the efforts for rapprochement that all the Greek governments 
made after 1999. Therefore, the thesis concludes that the Democratic Peace 
Theory cannot explain the peaceful relations between the two countries since 
1999 sufficiently.  
The view of the author is that Greece has to act decisively and it must 
send a clear sign to Turkey. The best opportunity for Greece to demonstrate to 
Turkey that it must play by the EU’s “rules of the game” that all the previous 
candidate states have followed, if of course it still wishes to become a member of 
the EU, is the European Council of December 2009. Since Turkey did not fulfill 
the criteria described in the Negotiating Framework Agreement and the 
 
256 Antonis Kotsiaros, The European Public Opinion and Turkey, Research Unit: Turkey-
Economy, Politics and International Relations (Athens: Institute of European Integration and 
Policy, 2007) available at http://eeep.pspa.uoa.gr (accessed August 10, 2009). 
257 The last crisis that almost led the two countries to war was the “Imia crisis” in 1996. 
258 Jane Addams. American Social Reformer, Peace Activist. 1931 Nobel Peace Prize 
Winner. 
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Accession Partnership document, Greece must propose the temporary freezing 
of the negotiation procedures for all the chapters of the acquis, at least until 
Turkey exhibits some feasible signs of response to the Greek efforts for 
rapprochement. A good start for Turkey’s policymakers will be to accept the fact 
that the accession negotiations are not a bargaining procedure. The sooner 
Turkey understands that the road to the European family passes through the full 
implementation of all the changes required by the acquis, the better Greco-
Turkish relations evolve.      
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